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Abstract 
 
The resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa is regarded 
not only as a threat to democratisation processes but also to peace, security and 
stability on the continent. The United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and 
various regional economic communities (RECs) have all sought to address this 
challenge, in what may be described as a trilateral linkage between the 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations.  
 
The unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar in 2009 led to the 
involvement of the UN, AU and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Although these organisations all responded to the case of Madagascar, it 
cannot be assumed that they all share a common understanding of and approach 
to unconstitutional changes of government. This study builds upon a 
constructivist approach to norm development, with a particular focus upon the 
norm life cycle. The thesis seeks to assess if a normative approach to dealing 
with unconstitutional changes of government has developed within the UN, AU 
and SADC respectively, and if so, how? Furthermore, how have these 
organisations responded to such a case, with a specific focus on Madagascar? 
Building upon these findings, the thesis aims to assess if and how a norm 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government has emerged, spread and 
become internalised within the UN, AU and SADC.  
 
The study illustrates that the norm condemning unconstitutional changes of 
government is particularly salient within the AU. Furthermore, and unlike many 
other peace and security norms, the norm condemning unconstitutional changes 
of government seems to have emerged from the level of the AU and impacts 
upwards on the UN as well as downwards on SADC. These findings imply that the 
AU will have a prominent role in informing the approach and response to such 
cases on the African continent in the future. Furthermore, the normative 
frameworks of the UN and SADC may be developed largely as a result of and on 
the basis of the principles and policies of the AU.   
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Opsomming 
 
 
Die herlewing van ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering in Afrika word nie net 
as 'n bedreiging vir die demokratiseringsprosesse beskou nie, maar ook vir 
vrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit op die kontinent. Die Verenigde Nasies (VN), die 
Afrika-Unie (AU) en verskeie streeks-ekonomiese gemeenskappe (REC's) het 
gepoog om hierdie uitdaging, wat beskryf kan word as ‘n driehoekskakeling 
tussen die internasionale, streeks- en substreek-organisasies, aan te spreek. 
Die ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering in Madagaskar in 2009 het gelei tot 
die betrokkenheid van die VN, AU en die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings 
gemeenskap (SAOG). Alhoewel hierdie organisasies op die Madagaskar-saak 
gereageer het, kan daar nie aanvaar word dat hulle ‘n gemeenskaplike begrip van 
en benadering tot die ongrondwetlike verandering van regering deel nie. Hierdie 
studie bou op 'n konstruktivisme  benadering tot die ontwikkeling van norme, 
met 'n spesifieke fokus op die lewensiklus van ‘n norm. Die tesis poog om te 
bepaal of 'n konstruktivisme benadering respektiewelik binne die VN, AU en 
SAOG ontwikkel het rakende ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering, en indien 
wel, hoe? Verder, hoe het hierdie organisasies gereageer op so 'n geval, met 
spesifieke fokus op Madagaskar? Met hierdie bevindinge in gedagte, sal die tesis 
bepaal of, en hoe, 'n norm wat ongrondwetlik regeringsveranderinge veroordeel, 
na vore gekom het en hoe dit versprei en binne die VN, AU en SAOG 
geïnternaliseer is.  
Hierdie studie illustreer dat die norm wat ongrondwetlik regeringsveranderinge 
veroordeel, besonder opvallend is binne die AU. In teenstelling met ander 
vredes- en sekuriteits norme, blyk dit dat die norm wat ongrondwetlik 
regeringsveranderinge veroordeel, sy oorsprong het op AU-vlak, met opwaartse 
trefkrag op die VN, sowel as afwaarts op SAOG. Hierdie bevindinge impliseer dat 
die AU in die toekoms 'n prominente rol in die benadering tot en reaksie op 
derglike gevalle op die Afrika-kontinent, sal hê. Verder kan die normatiewe 
raamwerke van die VN en SAOG moontlik hoofsaaklik ontwikkel as gevolg van 
die basis van beginsels en beleid wat deur die AU neergelê word. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction, Aim and Method 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Whilst the role of the United Nations (UN) remains central in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, regional and sub-regional organisations are 
increasingly regarded both by African regional bodies as well as by the 
international community as equally important actors in promoting and 
maintaining stability and security. In Africa, this has led to the involvement of the 
UN, African Union (AU) and various regional economic communities (RECs) in 
addressing peace and security challenges on the continent. Clear examples would 
be the conflict in Sierra Leone involving both the UN and ECOWAS, and the 
conflict in Darfur involving both the UN and the AU (Boulden, 2003: 12; Adebajo, 
2008: 140; Bah, 2010).  
An issue of increasing importance in Africa with regard to stability and 
security is the question of unconstitutional changes of government. The AU has 
come out strongly against such regime changes, expressing “deep concern over 
the resurgence of the scourge of coups d’état on the Continent, which constitutes 
not only a dangerous political downturn and a serious setback to the democratic 
processes, but also a threat to peace, security and stability of the Continent…” 
(AU, 2009a). At the same time, the UN Security Council also expressed “its deep 
concern over the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of Government in a few 
African countries, and the possible violence that might accompany such events, 
as well as the negative impact on the economic and social welfare of the people 
and the development of affected countries” (UNSC, 2009a). In this light, the 
political and security crisis in Madagascar in 2009 revealed a flux of actors 
responding to a case of an unconstitutional change of government. The Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) responded to the situation by 
condemning the unconstitutional actions which ousted President Ravalomanana, 
stating that it did not recognize Rajoelina as President of Madagascar “because 
this appointment not only violates the Constitution of Madagascar and 
democratic principles, but violates the core principles and Treaty of SADC, the 
African Union and the United Nations Charters” (SADC, 2009a). Yet equally, the 
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Madagascar crisis revealed a divergence of norms revolving around the issue of 
unconstitutional changes of government. 
Indeed, whilst the UN, AU and SADC all responded to the situation in 
Madagascar, it is far from certain that they all shared the same guiding 
frameworks to respond. As Williams and Haacke point out, different actors 
perceive of security and the consequent responses they consider as legitimate 
and effective in different ways (Williams and Haacke, 2008: 119). The approach 
to the protection of human rights and to humanitarian intervention are examples 
in which various actors perceive of these  issues and consider consequent 
responses to such cases in very different ways. Furthermore, the norms and 
principles on human rights and humanitarian intervention have emerged and 
become internalised by international, regional, sub-regional and national actors 
to a varying degree and in different ways.  
This thesis seeks to assess if a normative framework on unconstitutional 
changes of government has developed within the UN, AU and SADC respectively, 
and if so, how? Furthermore, how have these organisations consequently 
responded to norm-breaking behaviour on unconstitutional changes of 
government, with a specific focus on Madagascar? On the basis of these findings, 
the thesis seeks to assess if and how norms on unconstitutional changes of 
government have emerged and become internalised within these three 
organisations. Whilst it is a common assumption that the UN plays a dominant 
role in promoting and spreading norms on peace and security in the 
international system, this thesis will argue that it is predominantly the AU which 
has served to promote and spread the norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government on the African continent.  
 
1.2 Purpose and Significance of the Study  
 
Whilst material and other exogenous factors are regarded as important and 
central in studying the actions and responses by the UN, the AU and SADC to 
peace and security issues, the focus here will be upon norms and specifically 
upon norms on unconstitutional changes of government. In line with the 
argument of Krause, the purpose is not to rank ideational factors versus material 
interests (Krause, 1999: 2). Rather, it is to highlight the ideational factors that are 
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at play to broaden our understanding of how the UN, AU and SADC respectively 
have addressed the crisis in Madagascar. This thesis therefore aims to gain a 
better understanding of the salience of a norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government within these organisations and consequently which 
responses they consider available and appropriate. The study is considered to 
have particular significance in that the focus is upon ideational and normative 
factors, in contrast with material factors which are most commonly addressed in 
literature on security in Africa with regards to the capabilities and constraints of 
international and regional organisations.  
The focus will be upon a security issue in southern Africa and the role that 
the UN, AU and SADC have played. As underlined by numerous SADC 
communiqués on the situation in Madagascar, the crisis was regarded both as a 
political and security challenge for the region (SADC, 2010a; SADC, 2009a). The 
UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa noted in 2007 that “much of the 
literature on the activities of African regional organisations has so far focused on 
contributions of these organisations in peacekeeping and peace enforcement” 
(UN, 2007a: 3). The report continues to explain that “the structures and the 
activities undertaken by African regional organisations to prevent conflict and 
consolidate peace have received much less consideration” (UN, 2007a: 3). The 
case of Madagascar is considered to constitute a conflict, defined as “the pursuit 
of incompatible goals by different groups” and applicable to “any political 
conflict, whether it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force” 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 28). Unconstitutional changes of government and 
coups d’état are furthermore regarded as constituting a threat to peace, security 
and stability on the African Continent, and involves incompatible goals by 
different groups. The study of the UN, AU and SADC involvement in addressing 
the conflict in Madagascar therefore provides insight into conflict management, 
prevention and mediation in southern Africa and consequently focuses upon an 
area which, as noted above, has received less attention in the academic literature. 
This study therefore provides useful insights on how political violence and an 
unconstitutional change of government are addressed in the context of the 
southern African region. 
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In addition, this study is also similar to studies on the relationship 
between the UN, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and may therefore serve to provide useful comparative studies in the 
future. These organisations are commonly described as providing a “triangle for 
peace and security”, in which a particular case study involves a “trilateral 
linkage” between the UN, the AU and RECs (Ajayi, 2008; Bah, 2010b: 284). As 
Bah explains, such a trilateral linkage “provides useful lessons for future 
cooperation between the UN and regional entities, and between the AU and the 
RECs” (Bah, 2010b: 284). This study may therefore supplement literature on the 
cooperation between the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations, focusing 
upon ideational factors and providing particular insight on how these 
organisations approach and address unconstitutional changes of government on 
the African continent.  
The concept of unconstitutional changes of government stems from the 
more limited concept of coups d’état. McGowan and Johnson (1984: 634) define 
coups as “events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced 
by the action of relatively small groups, in which members of the military, police, 
or security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in 
conjunction with a number of civil servants or politicians”. Ikome (2007: 7) 
describes coups as  
 
…the sudden overthrow of a government against the general will (volonte generale) formed 
by the majority of the citizenry. It is usually carried out by a small, but well-organised group 
that threatens, or effectively uses, force to replace the top power echelons of the state.  
 
 Constitutions and constitutionality are described as embodying “the 
practices, customs, and rules through which power is established, exercised and 
transmitted in the state, ensuring the primacy of the law over both the governed 
and the governors- in other words, no one is above the law” (Ikome, 2007: 10). 
The constitution therefore defines modalities by which power can be acquired 
and exercised, and deviations from these norms are therefore regarded as 
unconstitutional.  
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Coups d’état may be regarded as one form of unconstitutional change of 
government.  Whilst the definitions of coups d’état place emphasis on the 
manner in which one comes into power, it is also important to address how a 
ruling party stays in power by constitutional means. Maru (2012: 68) 
distinguishes between two forms of unconstitutional changes of government, 
namely unconstitutional replacement and emplacement of constitutional 
government. Replacement is defined as an “illegal accession to power and it 
includes coups d’état, mercenary intervention and rebel insurgency” (Maru, 
2012: 68). Emplacement “refers to the illegal retention of power”, and may refer 
to the attempt by an incumbent to extend his term beyond that which is 
constitutionally mandated (Maru, 2012: 68). As will be presented in detail in 
Chapter Three, the AU recognizes the broader definition of unconstitutional 
changes of government, outlined particularly in the Constitutive Act and Lomé 
Declaration of 2000 as well as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance of 2007. It is this broader definition of unconstitutional changes of 
government which will be applied in this thesis.    
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
 
The main objectives of this thesis are to assess the salience of normative 
frameworks on unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, AU and 
SADC respectively and how they responded to Madagascar. On the basis of these 
findings, the thesis seeks to infer the manner in which norms on unconstitutional 
changes of government have emerged and spread in a multi-level international 
system. The focus upon the roles of the UN, AU and SADC builds upon the 
argument that international organisations in general, and these specific 
organisations in particular, have assumed a prominent role in promoting and 
maintaining peace and security on the African continent (Adebajo and Scanlon, 
2006; Akokpari et al, 2008). As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 3) argue, 
“international organisations have never been more central to world politics than 
they are today”. Similar studies upon the role of international organisations in 
African conflicts have been performed, particularly upon cooperation and 
collaboration between the UN, the AU and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (Ajayi, 2008; UN, 2007a). In these studies, scholars find 
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that there are differences in the how these various organisations approach one 
and the same conflict (Boulden, 2003; Jonah, 2006).  
Crucially, the focus upon the issue of unconstitutional changes of 
government and coups d’état in Africa has received increased attention in recent 
years. Such regime changes are regarded as a set-back in the democratic process, 
as well as a threat to peace and security in Africa. Souaré explains that “this 
happens at a time when the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) are striving to fine-tune their relevant mechanisms and 
policy/legal instruments to address what has been seen as one of the major 
sources of dysfunctionality of the post-colonial African state” (Souaré, 2009).   
The response to the political violence and consequent unconstitutional 
change of government in Madagascar by the UN, AU and SADC supports the 
assumption that these organisations do not accept unconstitutional changes of 
government. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892) explain, “we recognize 
norm-breaking behaviour because it generates disapproval or stigma…”. It 
cannot, however, be assumed that these three organisations have robust 
normative frameworks in place to address unconstitutional changes of 
government. Furthermore, it is far from a given that these three organisations 
share a common understanding of and approach to unconstitutional changes of 
government.  
In his article Thinking About Security in Africa, Paul Williams (2007) 
discusses the topic of how various actors think about and perceive of security in 
Africa in different ways. A series of articles on the political and security culture in 
West Africa further touches upon this subject, underlining the fact that there are 
differences in how actors perceive of security and what responses they consider 
legitimate and effective in addressing a security challenge (Williams and Haacke, 
2008: 119). Whilst these articles focus upon states, this thesis seeks to build 
upon this mode of analysis and apply it to the UN, AU and SADC.  
The main research question of this thesis is: 
 
Has a normative approach to dealing with unconstitutional changes of government 
developed within the UN, AU and SADC respectively, and if so, how?  
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To assess the salience of a norm condemning unconstitutional changes of 
government, the thesis will first seek to identify normative frameworks on 
unconstitutional changes of government with the UN, AU and SADC. 
Furthermore, a study of the response to the case of Madagascar will show how 
these organisations responded to a case of norm-breaking behaviour. Building 
upon these findings, the thesis will seek to assess how a norm condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government has emerged and spread in a multi-level 
international system.  
In framing these research questions then, the notion of constructivism as 
a social theory will provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. As 
McDonald (2008: 59) argues,  
 
“[c]onstructivism has become an increasingly prominent theoretical approach to 
International Relations since its emergence in the 1980s. Focusing on the role of 
ideational factors and the social construction of world politics, it is perhaps best 
described as a broader social theory which then informs how we might approach the 
study of security”.  
 
As will be outlined in a background review of the UN, AU and SADC in Chapter 
Three, normative changes have taken place within these organisations with 
regards to how they think about and approach security on the African continent. 
In seeking to understand the manner in which norms emerge and spread within 
the international system, literature on the norm life cycle and particularly the 
works of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Legro (1997) and Acharya (2004) will 
be presented in Chapter Two. Although acknowledging the prominent role of the 
UN in promoting and spreading norms on peace and security in the international 
system, these authors seek to better understand the role of regional, sub-regional 
and national actors within the multi-level international system. They argue that 
regional, sub-regional and national actors also play an important role in the 
process of norm emergence and diffusion. However, the common assumption 
remains that international norms emerge and spread particularly from the 
international level and downwards. In applying these approaches to the 
objectives of this thesis, these works will provide the framework for seeking to 
understand how norms addressing unconstitutional changes of government have 
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emerged and spread within the UN, AU and SADC and how this has informed 
their response to Madagascar.  
 
1.4 Methodology and Research Design  
 
This study is qualitative in nature, with an inductive approach in which the 
collection of data allows for developing insights and generalisations as the study 
progresses (Neuman, 2006: 153-154; Yin, 2003: 55). The purpose of this 
qualitative study is descriptive and exploratory, with the aim of assessing the 
salience of the norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government within 
the UN, AU and SADC and how they have consequently responded to such norm-
breaking behaviour. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to assess how a norm 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government has emerged and spread 
within a multi-level international system building upon the constructivist 
approach. This study may therefore also serve the purpose of theory-testing, in 
assessing if the constructivist approach on norm emergence and diffusion may 
be applied to norms on unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, 
AU and SADC.  
The units of analysis for this study are therefore the UN at the 
international level, the AU at the regional level, and SADC at the sub-regional 
level. This study does not seek to be explanatory, highlighting why it is that the 
UN, AU and SADC responded as they did. However, the findings of this study may 
lay the foundations for an explanatory study in the future. 
The case study approach has been chosen as the most appropriate for this 
study, as it is qualitative and exploratory in nature. Furthermore, case studies are 
found to be particularly relevant in studies of theory-testing (Van Evera, 1997: 
55). A common definition of a case study is “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context…” (Yin, 
2003: 13). As Bah explains, a case study upon the trilateral linkage between 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations may provide useful 
insights on the dynamics between these organisations and how they address 
peace and security issues (Bah, 2010b: 284).  
As Yin explains, a particular strength of case study data collection is the 
opportunity to use many different sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 97). Of 
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particular importance in collecting multiple sources of evidence is the 
opportunity to develop converging lines of inquiry, also referred to as a process 
of triangulation (Yin, 2003: 98). To ensure reliability of the data collected and 
consequent findings presented in this study, the triangulation process has been 
applied. In addition, the case study approach is generalizable to theoretical 
propositions but not to populations or universes (Yin, 2003: 10). Consistent with 
a case study design, this thesis seeks to expand and generalise the constructivist 
approach, in other words provide analytic generalisation, to test the assumptions 
on norm scholarship and particularly on the norm life cycle.  
The study firstly consisted of a literature review to develop the theoretical 
framework, to collect primary and secondary sources pertinent to the research 
questions, as well as to collect empirical data on the case of Madagascar. 
Qualitative data analysis was performed on the basis of both primary and 
secondary data collected. Primary data included public documents from the UN, 
AU and SADC including policy documents, communiqués, official statements and 
reports both on their normative approach toward unconstitutional changes of 
government and on their response to Madagascar. Secondary sources included 
academic literature pertinent to the research questions, sources from the media 
as well as data from research institutes and think tanks on the subject matter  
Field research was performed with the goal of executing interviews with 
persons who have extensive knowledge on the normative approach of the 
respective organisations toward unconstitutional changes of government as well 
as with persons who have worked closely on the organisations’ response to the 
case of Madagascar. Data collected from these interviews served to support other 
data sources and provided in-depth and detailed accounts of the UN, AU and 
SADC approach to the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar. 
The interviewees were from within the UN, AU and SADC as well from outside 
these organisations including researchers and civil society.  
Field work was performed in Pretoria and Cape Town in South Africa, to 
interview persons within the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO) of South Africa as well as with researchers and other 
persons who have extensive knowledge on the topic area. Attempts were made 
at interviewing persons at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, but the 
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interviews were cancelled last minute. Field work was also performed in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, to meet with persons within the AU, UN as well as other 
international organisations. Telephone interviews were performed with UN 
officials based in New York as well as with a few SADC officials based in 
Gaborone, Botswana.  
Semi-structured and open-ended interviews were performed with thirty-
one interviewees chosen by non-random sampling as well as by snowball 
sampling, on the basis of who was available and most appropriate to speak to 
with regards to the topic of this study as well as on the basis of personal 
referrals. As some of the material was still regarded as sensitive during the time 
of the interviews, most interviewees did not want to go on the record. In an 
attempt to provide an informal discussion and allow the interviewees to speak 
freely, no interviews were recorded. Rather, detailed notes were taken during 
the interviews. Anonymity is provided to those interviewees who requested it. 
Although all of the interviews are not directly referred to in this thesis, the list of 
respondents in Appendix I lists all respondents. This decision was made on the 
basis that all the interviews contributed to the overall insight and understanding 
on the research questions, providing important and useful information to the 
researcher during this study. Transcriptions from the interviews can be provided 
on request.  
 
1.5 Limitations and Delimitations  
 
The limitations to this study refer to the practical limitations of performing this 
study and include time constraints and limitations to the length of the thesis. 
Performing this research as a single observer, particularly in performing 
interviews, limits the ability of the researcher to obtain a multi-faceted 
understanding of the data collected. In addition, challenges to remain objective 
as a single observer must also be taken into account. 
Financial constraints must be considered, particularly with regards to the 
field work performed. A study scholarship from the Norwegian Institute for 
International Affairs (NUPI) as well as a travel scholarship from the Nordic Africa 
Institute (NAI) provided the finances necessary to perform three weeks of field 
work. Due to financial constrains the field work was performed in South Africa 
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and Ethiopia. Telephone interviews were performed with those not available in 
South Africa and Ethiopia, particularly with UN representatives based in New 
York as well as SADC representatives based in Gaborone, Botswana. 
An important limitation was the lack of interviews with Madagascan 
officials as well as other local actors in Madagascar including civil society and 
churches involved in the mediation process. Attempts were made at making 
appointments for interviews with Madagascan officials at the Madagascan 
Embassy in South Africa, with no luck. 
Language barriers were a limitation, since the official language in 
Madagascar is French. The data sources used for this thesis are therefore sources 
in English.  
Delimitations of this study include a time limit. In identifying normative 
frameworks on unconstitutional changes of government, the researcher has 
focused particularly upon documents from the late 1980s until 2012. This 
decision was based on noting that it was particularly in the past two decades that 
this topic has received increased attention. The case study of Madagascar was 
limited from the beginning of the political crisis in December 2008 up to June 
2012. 
In addition, a myriad of actors have been involved in addressing the crisis 
in Madagascar. This study has however been limited to the UN, AU and SADC 
thereby excluding other important actors including states such as France and the 
US as well as organisations such as the IOF (International Organisation of La 
Francophonie), the European Union (EU) and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern African (Comesa). The focus upon the UN, AU and SADC is based 
upon the purpose and aim of the study. Further studies may however be served 
with including additional international organisations, state actors and civil 
society to name a few. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the study, argued for the purpose 
and significance of the study and presented the research questions with a focus 
upon the normative frameworks of unconstitutional changes of government 
within the UN, AU and SADC, with a case study of Madagascar. The chapter has 
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further outlined the methodology and chosen research design and highlighted 
major limitations and delimitations to the study.  
Chapter Two will outline pertinent theories within International Relations 
and focus particularly upon the constructivist approach and theories on norm 
emergence, diffusion and internalisation in the international system. It is the 
constructivist approach which will serve as the main theoretical framework for 
this thesis. As Ruggie (1998) and Krause (1999) argue, the purpose is not to rank 
ideational factors in relation to materialistic ones, but to take ideational factors 
into account when seeking to understand the social world. In seeking to 
understand the manner in which norms emerge and diffuse in the international 
system, the works of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Legro (1997) and Acharya 
(2004) are of particular interest.  
Chapter Three will provide a background review of the UN, AU and SADC 
as organisations with a mandate to promote and maintain peace and security. In 
seeking to understand how a normative framework on unconstitutional changes 
of government has developed, it is also important to understand how these 
respective organisations have developed and changed in their approach toward 
peace and security issues. The main part of this chapter will seek to identify if a 
normative framework on unconstitutional changes of government is in place 
within the UN, AU and SADC and how these norms have emerged. 
Chapter Four will provide a detailed account of the unconstitutional 
change of government in Madagascar and the consequent efforts made toward 
finding a solution and ensuring a return to constitutional order. This chapter will 
focus particularly upon the manner in which the UN, AU and SADC have chosen 
to address and respond to the political crisis in Madagascar, building upon the 
findings on normative frameworks in Chapter Three.  
Chapter Five will provide a summary of the findings in this thesis and 
discuss the implications for the further development of normative frameworks 
on unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, AU and SADC. In 
addition, recommendations for further research areas will be discussed.  
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Chapter 2 
 Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis seeks to identify the normative frameworks which the UN, AU and 
SADC have in place to address unconstitutional changes of government to further 
assess how salient this norm is within the organisations. Do these organisations 
have normative frameworks in place to address unconstitutional changes of 
government and how have these organisations consequently responded to such a 
case? Whether a norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government is at 
all present and how this has consequently informed the behaviour of these 
organisations in addressing the case of unconstitutional change of government in 
Madagascar are key questions. Social constructivism will therefore serve as the 
main theoretical framework for this thesis. What is a norm? How do we know a 
norm is salient? And how does a salient norm affect the behaviour of actors in 
the international system? This chapter will review the prominent theoretical 
approaches within International Relations theory. A particular focus within 
constructivist literature will be upon the works of Finnemore (1993), Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998), Legro (1997) and Acharya (2004)  in seeking to understand 
how norms emerge, spread and become internalised by international, regional 
and sub-regional organisations.   
 
2.2 Prominent Theories within International Relations 
 
Major changes within the international system from the late 1980’s, described by 
Mueller (1995) as a “quiet cataclysm”, resulted in a shift within International 
Relations theory, challenging mainstream and critical approaches as these could 
not adequately explain the changes taking place within the system. Such changes 
included the fall of the Soviet Union and the end to the bilateral balance of power, 
as well as other major changes including continued Western European 
integration, the wave of democratisation and economic liberalisation through the 
former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the developing world as well as the 
improbability of war between the great powers (Elman, 2008: 20). The 
international system was found to be in a state of change, with an increased focus 
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upon international organisations (Cox, 1989: 825). More specifically, the focus on 
security arrangements turned towards the role of international institutions in 
the post-Cold War era, resulting in an increased focus upon the role of 
institutions within international relations theory (Mearsheimer, 1994: 5). The 
debate between neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists came as a result of 
these structural changes within the international system. Furthermore, the 
constructivist approach within International Relations theory gained 
prominence during this time period, particularly as a result of the inadequacies 
of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in explaining change in the 
international system as well as in addressing the changing nature of conflicts on 
the African continent. A major debate therefore concerned the issue of whether 
or not international institutions markedly affect the prospects for international 
stability and consequently peace and security (Mearsheimer, 1994; Keohane and 
Martin, 1995; Wendt, 1995). Furthermore, an emphasis upon social and 
ideational factors, promoted by constructivism, led to new analytical approaches 
argued to “sharpen our thinking on issues that neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
slight” (Katzenstein, 1996: 19).  
 
2.2.1 Realism, Neo-Realism and Neo-liberal Institutionalism  
 
The classical realist approach regarded the international system as anarchic, 
with no over-riding authority, in which states functioned within a self-help 
system. States were regarded as rational and central units of action which sought 
power and dominance as an end in itself or a means to an end (Keohane, 1986: 
7). Within an anarchic, self-help system Morgenthau presented the realist claim 
that the security of the state be pursued through the balance of power in which 
the state should be a value maximizing actor  (Dunne and Schmidt, 2008: 93; 
Keohane, 1986: 10). Moving beyond classical realism, Waltz in particular 
developed structural realism in which he systematizes political realism as a 
deductive approach focusing upon the structure of the international system in 
comparison with the classical realist approach which assumes an inductive 
approach on the basis of the actions and interactions between states (Lamy, 
2005: 208). Within the neo-realist approach, Waltz distinguishes himself from 
classical realism by excluding any assumptions about the units which make up 
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the international system except the claim that states at a minimum seek their 
own survival (Elman, 2008: 19; Lamy, 2005: 209). He focuses instead upon the 
effects of the structure in the international system, in which the ordering 
principle is regarded as anarchic (Elman, 2008: 18; Lamy, 2005: 209). 
Furthermore, the units within the system are argued to be functionally alike, on 
the basis of the self-help principle. Waltz therefore argues that the distinguishing 
factor is the distribution of capabilities across the units with a particular 
distinction between multi-polar and bipolar systems (Elman, 2008: 18). In this 
way Waltz goes beyond Morgenthau’s focus upon maximizing power and argues 
that a bipolar system is more stable than a multi-polar one, in which bipolarity 
reduces interdependence between states (Elman, 2008: 19). With regards to the 
function of international institutions in promoting cooperation, peace and 
stability, Waltz argues that the functions and capabilities of the institutions 
would heavily rely upon the most powerful units within the system, thereby 
placing emphasis upon the distribution of power and material capabilities (Lamy, 
2005: 209).  
In comparison to what neo-realists are particularly concerned with, 
namely state security, neo-liberal institutionalists focus upon the benefits of 
cooperation in areas such as economics and the environment which is argued to 
lead to cooperation in other areas including security. Neo-liberal institutionalism 
focuses particularly upon the effects which cooperation within international 
institutions may have to increase relations between states and thereby increase 
security within the international system. Neo-liberal institutionalism does 
resemble neo-realism in that it accepts the rational actor model in which states 
function within an anarchic international system with the distribution of power 
as a central feature (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 39; Lamy, 2005: 213). In this 
way, neo-liberal institutionalism does not challenge the status quo of the 
international system thereby serving to maintain what may be regarded as the 
hegemony of the realist assumptions within international relations theory. These 
shared assumptions support the claim by Mearsheimer that liberal 
institutionalism is merely “realism by another name” (Mearsheimer, 1995: 4). 
Keohane and Martin support this claim when they note that “for better or worse, 
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institutional theory is a half-sibling of neorealism” (Keohane and Martin in Jervis, 
1999: 43). 
Whilst the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
differs particularly on the issue of the potential international institutions may 
have in promoting cooperation, both share the assumption that states act as 
unified, rational actors within an anarchic international system (Katzenstein, 
1996: 12). Furthermore, these approaches share basic commitments to 
individualism and materialism. Individualist theories argue that actors within 
the international system have a set of innate and fixed interests and that 
collective understandings have no causal power or ontological status of their 
own (Barnett, 2005: 253; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). This reflects the 
shared commitment neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism have to the 
rational actor model treating the identities and interests of states as beyond the 
theory, exogenously given and building upon the assumption that “state interests 
are hard-wired and fixed forever” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 35; Wendt, 1992; 
Barnett, 2005: 253). In addition, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
share a commitment to materialist theories which assumes “that the structure 
that constrains behaviour is defined by factors such as the distribution of power, 
technology, and geography” (Barnett, 2005: 253). Although neo-liberal 
institutionalism does acknowledge that states may construct norms and 
institutions which promote their own interests, “neither approach can imagine 
that ideas and norms might not only constrain but actually construct how states 
define their interests” (Barnett, 2005: 253). This depicts a clear distinction 
between neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism on one side, which both 
largely focus upon material factors, and the constructivist approach on the other, 
which emphasizes the importance of ideational factors within international 
relations theory.  
Whilst neo-realists have a more pessimistic view upon the role of 
institutions in promoting cooperation and consequently security within the 
international system, both theories acknowledge the role institutions may play in 
promoting cooperation between states. However, issues of absolute and relative 
gains, the risk of cheating and the assumption that states participate in 
cooperative behaviour within institutions only as long as it serves their interests 
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largely limits the functions which international institutions are considered to 
have. Neo-liberalism and neo-realism therefore share a common epistemology 
and differ particularly in what they study, with a neo-realist focus upon “high 
politics” or security studies whilst neo-liberal concerns are within what is 
commonly referred as “low politics” or issues including economic cooperation 
and environmental issues (Lamy, 2005: 216). 
In discussing the variations between neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism, Jervis points out that these two approaches analyze different 
things (Jervis, 1999: 45). Whilst neo-realism focuses upon the security of the 
state in which relations between states are characterized as conflictual and 
competitive, neo-liberal institutionalism builds its arguments on the basis of 
international political economy and the environment (Lamy, 2005: Jervis, 1999). 
The claim that these two approaches “study different worlds” may be further 
applied to the constructivist approach, which gained prominence within 
international relations theory in the early 1990’s (Jervis, 1999: 45). 
Constructivism developed as a broader social theory within International 
Relations with a particular focus upon how world politics is socially constructed 
(Wendt, 1995: 2). Rather than focus upon material aspects influencing state 
behaviour, constructivism argues for the importance of discourse, ideas, norms, 
identities and inter-subjective understandings as driving forces in constructing 
the understanding that individuals, states, institutions and other actors have of 
themselves and of the order of the international system (Mearsheimer, 1994: 38; 
Wendt, 1992; Ruggie, 1998). Constructivism therefore moves beyond the state-
centric and largely a-historical approach, focusing upon idealistic versus material 
factors. Whilst there are various strands within the constructivist approach, all 
constructivism is described as using “an ideational ontology and holism in some 
way” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393).  
 
2.3 Realism versus Reality: Enter Constructivism 
 
The foundation of constructivism focuses upon the social construction of world 
politics and is therefore described as a broader social theory within International 
Relations, which gained prominence in the field particularly from the late 1980’s 
(McDonald, 2008: 59). Central within the constructivist approach is the focus 
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upon ideational factors which influence and shape the ideas, interests and 
identities of actors within the international system (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001). These ideational factors are not only present at the individual level, but 
are social and shared among groups within society. This form of idealism does 
not however reject material factors, but argues that “the meaning and 
construction of that material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation” 
(Barnett, 2005: 258). Ruggie (1998) and Krause (1999) support this claim in that 
the purpose is not to rank ideational factors in relation to materialistic ones, but 
to take ideational factors into consideration when seeking to understand the 
social world and global politics. Katzenstein builds upon this argument when he 
poses the question of how we may conceive of the international environment if 
we look beyond the physical capabilities of states and consider the cultural-
institutional context of the political environment and the political construction of 
identity (Kaztenstein, 1996: 17, 26). In addition to constructivism’s ideational 
ontology, it also accepts some form of holism or what is also described as 
structuralism (Barnett, 2005: 258). Holism concerns the claim that the social 
world is composed of more than the already existing actors within the system 
and that shared ideas constitute and shape the organisation of world politics 
(Barnett, 2005: 258).  
Although neo-liberal institutionalism does acknowledge that states may 
construct norms and institutions to promote state interests, neither neo-realism 
nor neo-liberal institutionalism acknowledge the constructivist claim that ideas 
and norms not only constrain but also construct how states define their interests 
(Barnett, 2005: 253). Identities and interests are therefore not assumed to be 
exogenously given, but are argued to be endogenous to the structure of the 
international system in which the most important ideational factors are inter-
subjective beliefs that are not reducible to the individual (Wendt, 1992; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). Inter-subjective beliefs will be defined as 
collectively held ideas and understandings on social life (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001: 392). The focus upon inter-subjective beliefs therefore goes beyond the 
individualistic approach and leads to a particular interest in shared 
understandings which collective groups may have within international 
institutions and reflects the holistic approach within constructivism.  
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On the basis of the argument that the world is constituted through inter-
subjective interaction then, constructivism argues that both agents and 
structures within the international system are mutually constituted (McDonald, 
2008: 59). Wendt (1992) led this discussion in arguing that not only are agents 
within the system constrained by the structure of the international system as 
neo-realism argues, but that the interests and identities of agents also serve to 
influence and possibly transform the structure of the system itself. This 
argument may be further applied to institutions, as Katzenstein depicts when he 
argues that “institutions can constitute, to varying degrees, the identities of 
actors and thus shape their interests” (Katzenstein, 1996: 17). In line with what 
Wendt describes as “strong liberals”, Wendt argues for the importance of 
acknowledging the “processes” by which identities and interests come about and 
how these then influence the structure of the international system (Wendt, 1992: 
393). For the purposes of this study, we seek to understand if and how a 
normative approach to unconstitutional changes of government has come about 
and how this consequently affects the behaviour of actors in the international 
system. Is the norm condemning unconstitutional change of government 
prevalent in the UN, AU and SADC? How has this norm come about? And how 
does it influence the decisions and actions taken by the respective organisations? 
 
2.3.1 The Importance of Social Facts within World Politics 
 
The focus upon processes within the international system in general, and 
international institutions in particular, has led to various approaches within the 
constructivist realm seeking to understand “how social facts change and the 
ways these influence politics” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393). In 
comparison with “brute facts” such as rocks, trees, and flowers, which exist 
irrespective of human presence in the world, “social facts” cannot exist without a 
shared understanding and agreement of its existence. Examples of social facts 
are for example money, states, sovereignty and anarchy as Wendt (1992) points 
out when he argues that “anarchy is what states make of it”. These social facts 
exist because it has been agreed upon collectively, yet these facts may ultimately 
be taken for granted and consequently become objective facts that constrain the 
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decisions and actions which agents take within the system (Barnett, 2005: 259; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
Building upon the common assumption that norms, identities and inter-
subjective beliefs do matter, constructivists have sought to support this 
argument by developing theories “about the mutual constitution process and the 
behaviour that results from it” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 394). This builds 
upon the argument presented by Wendt, namely that “structure has no existence 
or causal powers apart from process”, and leads to questions of how norms 
emerge, under what conditions, how they are internalised and the ways they 
consequently inform change within the international system (Wendt, 1992: 395). 
There are a broad range of approaches under the umbrella of 
constructivism, all focusing upon various aspects of the mutual constitution 
process between agents and structures and how this consequently informs 
behaviour. These include studies on discourse analysis, theories of agency and 
culture, notions of security communities, and theories on organisational 
behaviour, amongst others (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 394). What all of these 
have in common is the aim of supporting the claim that ideational factors, and 
more specifically norms, culture and identities, have explanatory and causal 
power of their own.  
 
For constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is not 
mere description. Understanding the constitution of things is essential in explaining how 
they behave and what causes political outcomes… Constitution in this sense is causal, since 
how things are put together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of political 
behaviour. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 394) 
 
This claim provides the basis for the various theoretical approaches 
developed under the umbrella of constructivism in seeking to study the social 
construction processes occurring at the international, regional, national and sub-
national levels and how norms consequently influence international politics and 
change within the international system (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). By 
identifying the normative approaches of the UN, AU and SADC toward 
unconstitutional changes of government, we expect to gain a better 
understanding of why they acted as they did and what this means for the further 
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development of a norm addressing unconstitutional changes of government 
within the international system.  
 
2.3.2 The Impact of Norms upon Behaviour 
 
Whilst acknowledging materialistic factors as well as strategic and rational 
motivations for political action, norms, identities and cultures are also regarded 
as necessary factors to consider within international relations theory 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 5). Norms are generally defined as “a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”, and may define or 
constitute identities as well as prescribe or regulate behaviour (Katzenstein, 
1996: 5).  
There remain however some conceptual challenges to the concept of 
norms. One important distinction to make is the difference between norms and 
institutions. The concept of institutions is most commonly applied within 
sociological studies and is defined as “a relatively stable collection of practices 
and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific 
situations” (March and Olsen in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Whilst the 
definition of norms “isolates single standards of behaviour”, institutions 
“emphasize the way in which behavioural rules are structured together and 
interrelate” (Finnemore and Sikkink: 1998: 891).  
In further addressing conceptual issues on norms, norms are 
distinguished as “either constituting, regulating, or enabling actors or their 
environments, presenting the distinction between constitutive, regulative, and 
evaluative/prescriptive norms (Legro, 1997: 33). Ruggie (1998) addressed the 
concepts of constitutive and regulative rules to distinguish between neo-realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism on one side and constructivism on the other. 
Here Ruggie argues that the former theories do not acknowledge the importance 
of constitutive rules which “define the set of practices that make up a particular 
class of consciously organized social activity” (Ruggie, 1998: 871). In the same 
vein, Katzenstein discusses norms as having both constitutive and regulative 
effects upon the behaviour of actors. Constitutive norms “operate like rules that 
define the identity of an actor” in which a prime example is that of state 
sovereignty and the recognition of this status within international institutions 
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(Katzenstein, 1996: 5). Furthermore, constitutive norms may create new actors, 
interests, or categories of action (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Norms also 
have regulative effects by specifying standards of proper behaviour thereby 
limiting the range of behavioural options considered available and appropriate 
by actors in the system (Katzenstein, 1996: 5, 20). A third category of norms are 
termed prescriptive or evaluative norms which impact upon the thought process 
of actors in determining policy and action and is described as referring to the 
quality of “‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891).  
These categories of norms parallel the concepts of logic of consequences 
and logic of appropriateness. Logic of consequences particularly resembles the 
rational actor model, and attributes “human behaviour to the anticipated costs 
and benefits of particular action, mindful that other actors are doing the same” 
(Barnett, 2005: 259). The logic of appropriateness however is of particular 
concern within norm scholarship, in that it argues that actors “determine their 
course of action depending on a sense of self and what is appropriate for the 
situation” (Barnett, 2005: 259). In arguing for the importance of the third 
category of norms, namely prescriptive/evaluative norms, Finnemore and 
Sikkink argue that because “norms involve standards of ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ 
behaviour, both the intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are 
inescapable when discussing norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). 
Norms are therefore regarded as important social factors which enable 
and constrain the behaviour and action of actors in the international system. 
Building upon the works of Goldstein (1993 in Acharya, 2004: 240), Acharya 
distinguishes nicely between norms and ideas when he explains that ideas may 
be held privately whilst norms are always collective and behavioural (Acharya, 
2004: 240). Norms are furthermore not static or fixed, but fluid and change over 
time (Katzenstein, 1996: 10). This has led to a body of literature discussing the 
“life cycle” of norms, which must be assessed within an historical context 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892). Where norms derive from is a central 
question within constructivism. Norms may spontaneously evolve, as social 
practice, they may be consciously promoted, or deliberately negotiated 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 21). They provide the premises for action, and may have 
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both negative and positive effects. Although norms encourage certain types of 
behaviour they are not determinative, but only limit the range of options 
available (Williams, 2007: 258; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). And whilst 
occasional violations of norms do not invalidate them, recurrent violations of 
norms which receive no meaningful repercussions will ultimately invalidate a 
norm (Katzenstein, 1996: 20; Legro, 1997: 33; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
894).  
 
2.4 The Life Cycle of a Norm    
 
Building upon the premises of constructivism, which argues for the importance 
of acknowledging social processes within the international system and the 
manner in which collectively held or inter-subjective beliefs impact upon policy 
and action, Finnemore and Sikkink explain that “in an ideational structure, idea 
shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894). Based upon the categories of norms, and 
particularly the logic of appropriateness, norms are argued to set and also reset 
standards of appropriate behaviour amongst actors in the international system. 
Numerous issue areas illustrate the impact of norms upon change in the 
international system, including the decolonization process, the abolition of 
slavery, the promotion of human rights and humanitarian intervention, the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the prevalence of capitalism, as well as gender equality. The 
manner in which norms emerge, change and diffuse across the international 
system, also referred to as the life cycle of a norm, has received much attention 
within constructivism. The study on norm life cycles has resulted in what 
Acharya (2004) presents as two waves of scholarship on norm diffusion.  
 
2.4.1 The First Wave of Norm Scholarship  
 
The first wave of scholarship on norm diffusion is presented as focusing 
particularly upon “transnational agents and processes shaping norm diffusion at 
the level of the international system” (Acharya, 2004: 240). Central works within 
this first wave of scholarship include works by Finnemore (1993) and Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998). Finnemore (1993) performed a study on how the new norm 
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promoting the idea that states are responsible for science, leading to science 
policy bureaucracies, has spread within the international system. The central 
argument in her article claims that “organisational innovation was supplied to 
states from outside, from an international organisation, rather than being the 
product of any characteristics internal to or inherent in the state itself” 
(Finnemore, 1993: 566). This argument builds upon the constructivist 
theoretical framework that treats states as social entities, shaped by 
international social action (Finnemore, 1993: 566). Consequently, state policies 
and structures are shaped by changes in inter-subjective understandings within 
the international system upon the role of the modern state. Building upon this 
constructivist framework, Finnemore argues that international organisations 
have the role as principals, rather than merely being agents, in international 
politics. It is upon this theoretical foundation that Finnemore argues for the 
central role of UNESCO, as an international organisation, in spreading the new 
norm on the idea that states are responsible for science policy bureaucracies. In 
her findings, Finnemore finds that UNESCO as an international-level actor played 
a proactive role in forming the identification and definition of policy options at 
the state level (Finnemore, 1993: 593). The role of international organisations is 
therefore argued to be important not only in constraining the activity of states, as 
neo-realists argue, but also in shaping and spreading ideas and norms at the 
state level. This study therefore places emphasis upon international-level actors 
in forming, shaping and spreading ideas and norms within the international 
system.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) further build upon this top-down approach 
in their article “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, focusing 
upon the “social construction processes and norm influences in international 
politics” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). Central to their argument is the 
theory of a norm’s life cycle, understood as a three-stage process in which the 
first stage is norm emergence, the second norm acceptance or what they also 
describe as norm cascading, and the third being norm internalisation 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895). An important aspect in their approach is 
their focus upon the relationship between domestic and international norms. In 
seeking to understand the processes by which norms emerge and spread across 
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the international system, Finnemore and Sikkink place emphasis upon the 
relationship between domestic and international norms arguing that domestic 
norms “are deeply entwined with the workings of international norms” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). Domestic norms are regarded as important 
particularly in the early stages of norm emergence and that many international 
norms originally began as domestic norms and then spread to the international 
level through the efforts of norm entrepreneurs of various kinds (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 893). On the basis of this approach, Finnemore and Sikkink argue 
that “international norms must always work their influence through the filter of 
domestic structures and domestic norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). 
They therefore refer to the works of Putnam on two-level games, in which they 
argue that “there is a two-level norm game occurring in which the domestic and 
the international norm tables are increasingly linked” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 893). With the increased role and significance of regional organisations in 
international politics today however, it may be appropriate to add a third level, 
namely the regional level, in the study of the dynamics of agreement processes 
upon norms within world politics.  
In presenting the stages of a norm’s life cycle then, domestic norms are 
regarded as most influential in the early stage of norm emergence, in which norm 
entrepreneurs play an important role in promoting and framing the norm in a 
manner which serves to influence how actors think about and perceive of a 
certain issue area. As they argue, “little normative change occurs without 
significant domestic movements supporting change” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998: 902). Following this first stage, a tipping point occurs in which domestic 
factors become less important and dynamics at the international level become 
the focal point. At this stage “an international or regional demonstration effect or 
‘contagion’ occurs in which international and transnational norm influences 
become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). More specifically, Finnemore and Sikkink 
argue that “the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active 
process of international socialisation intended to induce norm breakers to 
become norms followers” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). Socialization is 
defined as “the induction of new members…into the way of behaviour that are 
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preferred in a society” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902, fn62). Socialization is 
regarded as the dominant mechanism in norm cascading, in which states, 
networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations are regarded as 
central agents of norm socialization. The focus therefore turns from the domestic 
to the international level, in which states are argued to comply with norms at 
stage two on the basis of their identities as members of an international society 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902).  
In studying the process of norm diffusion, an important point is the fact 
that norms do not emerge and disseminate within a vacuum but “instead emerge 
in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other 
norms and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). New 
norms which are emerging might therefore compete with already established 
and internalised norms, thereby challenging particular ways of thinking. The 
norm on humanitarian intervention provides a good example of the challenge of 
an emerging norm upon already established ones (Bellamy and Williams, 2006). 
The established norm of state sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity 
of a state has been internalized and written into law in article 2(4) the Charter of 
the United Nations in which the use of force is allowed only on the basis of 
specific conditions outlined in Chapter VII, and particularly article 51, as well as 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (UN, 2010a). The norm of humanitarian 
intervention then, building largely upon moral rather than legal grounds, directly 
challenges particular ways of thinking about state sovereignty, security and the 
right to intervene within a sovereign state. The case of Darfur directly reflects 
this competition between the norm on state sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and the norms on human security and humanitarian intervention or what may 
also be called the principle of non-indifference (Bellamy and Williams, 2006; 
Akokpari et al, 2008). This normative contestation “has important implications 
for our understandings of the ways in which a ‘logic of appropriateness’ relates 
to norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The competition between various 
actors in the system seeking to promote these contesting norms is therefore an 
important process which occurs in the emergence and consequent 
internalisation of norms, and relates to the literature on how norms are diffused 
and internalised.  
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In this first wave of norm scholarship then, the focus of the study upon 
how norms spread and diffuse across the system place an emphasis upon the 
international level and on transnational agents. Both Finnemore (1993) and 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) approach the study of norm diffusion largely at 
the international level, in which transnational agents and international 
organisations are presented as central in understanding how and why norms 
spread within the international system. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) also point 
out the importance of the domestic level, particularly in the early stage of norm 
emergence, but neither of these articles places much emphasis upon the regional 
level and the role regional organisations may have in promoting and spreading 
norms both upwards, on the international level, and downwards to the state 
level. Acharya seeks to address this and presents an alternative approach, 
describing this as the second wave of norm scholarship within international 
relations theory. 
 
2.4.2 The Second Wave of Norm Scholarship 
 
In addressing the manner in which norms come about and impact upon the 
behaviour of actors, a second wave of scholarship has turned towards a focus at 
the regional, national and sub-national levels in seeking to better understand the 
manner in which norms disseminate and are internalised by local and regional 
actors.  
Legro seeks to develop constructivism by asking the question of “which 
norms matter, the ways they matter, and how much they matter relative to other 
factors” (Legro, 1997: 31). He argues that too much emphasis is placed upon 
international norms and that norms rooted in other types of social entities 
including regional, national, and sub-national groups must also be addressed 
(Legro, 1997: 32). Furthermore, whilst international norms matter in important 
ways, they are internalized differently by actors from the international to the 
sub-national levels. This leads Legro to emphasize organisational culture at the 
domestic level in helping to understand how norms become internalized and to 
help in explaining variations in norm adherence and violation. Legro therefore 
approaches the study of norm emergence, internalisation and diffusion from the 
domestic level and argues for the central importance of acknowledging domestic 
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level factors, and particularly organisational culture, in understanding the impact 
of norms upon state behaviour. However, the focus still remains upon how 
norms at the international level spread downwards and are internalized by 
domestic actors thereby supporting the top-down approach of Finnemore and 
Sikkink.  
 Acharya (2004) has also addressed this question of which and whose 
ideas matter, underlining the importance of acknowledging how local beliefs and 
identities inform the manner in which a foreign norm is diffused and localized by 
regional actors and consequently a regional organisation, in this case the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, in studying the 
manner in which foreign norms are internalised by a regional organisation, 
Acharya supports the approaches of Finnemore (1993) and Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) in that he places emphasis upon “foreign norms” within the 
international system thereby also taking a top-down approach. His central focus 
however is upon how regional organisations, ASEAN in particular, respond and 
adapt to foreign norms so that they may become internalised within the regional 
organisation.   
Acharya’s argument builds upon the limits of the first wave of norm 
scholarship, emphasizing “how domestic political structures and agents 
condition normative change” (Acharya, 2004: 240). In seeking to understand the 
manner in which ASEAN has internalised international norms, Acharya focuses 
upon the agency of norm-takers and the process of congruence-building based 
upon local beliefs and practices which he describes as a process of localization. 
Localization is therefore defined as “the active construction (through discourse, 
framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which 
results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and 
practices” (Acharya, 2004: 245). Similar to the agent-structure approach 
presented by Wendt (1992), the existing normative order within a region and at 
the local level and external norms are mutually constitutive of each other 
(Acharya, 2004: 251-252). This process of localization is then applied by Acharya 
in seeking to understand how and why ASEAN did make institutional changes 
within the organisation to adapt to the “common security” norm whilst the 
organisation did not manage to sufficiently dilute the norm of non-interference 
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within the organisation (Acharya, 2004: 240-241). The focus still, however, 
remains upon ‘foreign’ or ‘international’ norms and they way in which they 
spread and are internalised by regional and domestic actors.  
 
2.5 Applying Theory to Practice 
 
In seeking to answer the main research questions of this thesis, the theoretical 
framework chosen as most appropriate is constructivist thought. Constructivism 
argues that ideational factors and the processes by which identities and interests 
come about are important when seeking to understand the international system 
and the behaviour of actors within this system. Ideas and norms not only 
constrain but also construct how actors define their interests and thereby take 
action. Agents and structures are therefore mutually constitutive of each other, 
which helps to explain behaviour as a result of this mutual constitution process.  
 To answer the research question it must first be established whether a 
normative approach to dealing with unconstitutional changes of government has 
emerged and is at all salient within the UN, AU and SADC. A salient norm 
influences the choices made and actions taken, or not, by social actors. The 
salience of a norm may be measured by its level of institutionalisation by social 
actors. In this case, is there a robust normative framework in place in the UN, AU 
and SADC to address unconstitutional changes of government? Furthermore, the 
salience of a norm may be identified when other actors within the international 
system react to, condemn or take action on norm-breaking behaviour 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). How have the UN, AU and SADC responded to 
the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar?  
 On the basis of these findings, the thesis aims to gain insight in how a 
normative approach towards unconstitutional changes of government has 
emerged within the UN, AU and SADC. Furthermore, this study seeks to assess 
the manner in which such a norm has manifested itself within a multi-tiered 
international system. Do we find support for the approaches of Finnemore and 
Sikkink, Acharya and Legro in placing emphasis upon norms spreading from the 
international level and downwards? Or has a norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government emerged from the regional or sub-regional level? These 
are questions guiding the remainder of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
The Normative Frameworks of the UN, AU and SADC 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
To understand the manner in which norms emerge, spread and become 
internalised within international, regional and sub-regional organisations, it is 
important to provide an historical-political context for the study. A background 
review of how the UN, AU and SADC have become prominent actors in promoting 
and maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa will therefore first be 
provided. The chapter will then provide an in-depth study of if and what 
normative frameworks the UN, AU and SADC have in place to address 
unconstitutional changes of government.  
 
3.1.1 A Background of the UN 
 
During the first four decades of United Nations activities promoting international 
peace and security, the UN supported one operation in Africa—the Congo from 
1960 to 1964 (Boulden, 2003: 13; Dokken, 2008: 147). UN activities during this 
time period were commonly placed within Cold War dynamics which hampered 
the capabilities of the UN to deal with crises (Alao et al, 1999: 3). The changing 
dynamics of the international system from the late 1980s onwards however led 
to a large increase in UN operations on the African continent allowing for “new 
opportunities for the United Nations in the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflict” (Goulding, 1999: 161). However, the withdrawal of the UN 
from Somalia in 1993 and the subsequent failure of the UN in Rwanda in 1994 
largely undermined the credibility of the UN and resulted in “widespread 
hesitancy on the part of member-states to participate in operations dealing with 
complex conflicts” (Boulden, 2003: 3; Goulding, 1999: 163). It was within this 
context that the UN took a step back to reassess its operations in Africa and 
“rethink the way in which the UN deals with international peace and security” 
(Boulden, 2003: 3).  
This process of rethinking its role and approach in dealing with conflicts 
in Africa reflects the process of change which has subsequently taken place in 
how the UN approaches peace and security on the African continent. Two central 
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topics clearly depict this change in ideas and thinking, namely the re-
conceptualization by the UN of peacekeeping and of security (Dokken, 2008). 
The “traditional” notion of peacekeeping focused upon the principles of 
consent, impartiality and minimal use of force (for defence and not coercive 
force), in addition to a strong commitment to the principles of state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity (Dokken, 2008: 156; Alao et al, 1999: 4). With the 
changing dynamics of conflicts in Africa in the early 1990s involving a large 
increase in intra-state conflicts and an increase in the number of actors involved, 
including both state and non-state actors, conflicts became more complex and 
resulted in “second-generation” peacekeeping which had a broader operational 
scope and included peace enforcement (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 135; Dokken, 
2008: 156). Following the failures in Somalia and Rwanda, however, “second-
generation” peacekeeping was reassessed and the principles of impartiality and 
consent were revised. As a result, impartiality now requires that the UN 
continues to be neutral to a conflict but “would not stand by while civilians are in 
imminent threat of danger” (Dokken, 2008: 166). In addition, the nature of 
consent changed as a result of cases in which there was a lack of a central 
authority maintaining control over state territory. Consent to intervene in 
internal conflicts in what are regarded as “failed states” is therefore sought by 
the UN from the affected areas (Alao et al, 1999: 7; Dokken, 2008).  
The concept of security also expanded from a state-centric approach to 
the notion of human security, a concept introduced by the Human Development 
Report in 1994, which shifts the focus towards the protection of individuals and 
communities and stretches “‘security’ both horizontally (beyond merely military 
objectives) and vertically, to incorporate not just states, but regional and 
international structures, as well as local and individual actors” (Hutchful, 2008: 
63-64; Dokken, 2008: 159). As Hutchful (2008) underlines, the notion of human 
security did not exclusively evolve from within the UN. He identifies “a long and 
distinctive tradition of African ‘human security’ thinking or sentiment” (Hutchful, 
2008: 64). But within the context of the UN approach to African conflicts, the re-
conceptualization of the notion of security reflects how the UN has evolved in its 
approach to and understanding of conflicts in Africa. 
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 Another key development in the UN approach to African peace and 
security was the increased support for Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, outlining 
the relationship between regional organisations and the UN and what role 
regional organisations may play in promoting international peace and security. 
Whilst there were no formal activities under Chapter VIII throughout the Cold 
War, interest in regional organisations began to receive great attention from the 
UN from the early 1990s (Boulden, 2003: 1). The Agenda for Peace presented by 
UN Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros-Ghali in 1992 presents the beginnings of 
several official documents emphasizing the role regional organisations may play 
in international peace and security. In Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali 
acknowledged the need for cooperation with regional and sub-regional 
organisations and arrangements, stating that “’regional actions as a matter of 
decentralization, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could 
[…] lighten the burden of the Council’ and, most importantly, ‘contribute to a 
deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international 
affairs’” (UNSG 1992 in Dokken, 2008: 162). Further support for the prominent 
role of regional organisations was underlined in Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace by Boutros-Ghali in 1995 which UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan 
further supported in a statement in 1998 emphasizing that “providing support 
for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and 
desirable” (UNSG 1998 in Dokken, 2008: 162). To further strengthen cooperation 
between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa, the 
Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU was signed 
in 2006 to serve as an overall strategic framework for cooperation between the 
UN and AU. The main objective was to “enhance the capacity of the AUC and the 
African sub-regional organisations to act as effective UN partners in addressing 
the challenges to human security in Africa” (UN, 2010b). Whilst peace and 
security were initially given main priority, the focus was extended to six issue 
areas which also placed emphasis on governance and development. During the 
same time period, both the AU and SADC revised their institutions seeking to 
form a security-political strategy of their own and becoming prominent actors in 
addressing peace and security on the African continent (Dokken, 2008: 18). It is 
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within this context that UN, AU and SADC responses to the unconstitutional 
change of government in Madagascar must be understood.  
 
3.1.2 A Background of the OAU/AU 
 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 with the aim of 
“liberating African countries from colonial oppression and fostering social and 
economic self-determination” (Murithi, 2005: 3). The OAU served to promote the 
notion of Pan-Africanism “motivated by ideas that have placed an emphasis on 
the cultural unity and political independence of Africans” (Mathews, 2008: 27). 
Particularly following the wave of independence of African countries in the 
1970s and what is described as the nationalist generation, the OAU consequently 
fell short in achieving its goals of African unity (Mathews, 2008: 32). In addition, 
the 1990s involved an increase in intra-state conflict in places such as Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Somalia, “culminating in the tragic genocide in Rwanda in 
1994” (Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2008: 6). It is within this context that the 
African Union was established in 2002 with hopes that this organisation would 
provide a new start upon which the Pan-Africanist movement could better 
address major challenges on the African continent. In addition, the failures of the 
UN to address security challenges in Africa in the 1990s further motivated and 
provided a space for regional organisations to gain prominence and strengthen 
their peace and security mechanisms (Hutchful, 2008: 63).  
 Of particular importance with regards to the issues of peace and security 
on the African continent and as a result of the transformation of the OAU to the 
AU was “the establishment of a comprehensive peace and security regime” (ISS, 
2009; Bah, 2010b: 281). This resulted in what is now referred to as the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which is institutionalised within the 
framework of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 and the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU which was 
launched in May 2004 (ISS, 2009; Mwanasali, 2008; Bah, 2010b: 282). Article 
3(f) of the Constitutive Act underlines the objective of the AU to “promote peace, 
security and stability on the continent”, which the PSC serves to promote under 
Article 3 of the Protocol stating that the Council will serve “‘as a standing 
decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of 
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conflicts, and a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate 
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’” 
(Mwanasali, 2008: 43; AU, 2002). A key development under the AU Constitutive 
Act is the shift from the norm of non-intervention and non-interference to what 
is commonly referred to as the norm of non-indifference under article 4(h). This 
shift allows the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in 
instances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (AU, 2000). To 
further support the comprehensive peace and security architecture of the AU, the 
PSC is supported by the African Union Commission (AUC), a Panel of the Wise, a 
Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Special 
Fund (Bah, 2010b: 284). These developments depict the normative shift which 
the AU, similar to the UN, has undergone in the last decade exemplified by the 
norm of non-indifference as well as norms of good governance and human rights, 
as articulated in the AU Constitutive Act (Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2008: 6; 
Bah, 2010b: 283; Williams, 2007: 266).  
 
3.1.3 A Background of the SADC 
 
Complimenting the increased focus upon and support for regional organisations, 
the establishment of the AU also served to “renew focus on the relationship 
between the continental organisation and the various sub-regional 
organisations” (Dokken, 2008: 20). The relationship between the AU and 
regional economic communities (RECs) served to form part of the overall peace 
and security architecture of the AU, with RECs serving as stepping stones for the 
security-political efforts of the AU (Oosthuizen, 2006: 216; Dokken, 2008: 20).  
Two regional groupings developed in the southern African region from 
the independence years of the 1960s through to 1980, which subsequently led to 
the establishment of SADC (Oosthuizen, 2006: 53). The first regional grouping, 
the Frontline States (FLS), was founded in the 1970s as an “informal political 
alliance” seeking political and security co-operation particularly in response to 
efforts by the apartheid regime in South Africa to destabilise the region as well as 
to support decolonisation projects such as that in Rhodesia and Namibia at the 
time (Solomon, 2004: 9; Oosthuizen, 2006: 53; Khadiagala, 2007: 10). As the FLS 
served to promote security and political co-operation amongst its members, the 
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Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was launched 
in 1980 and formally established in July 1981 with a primary goal to promote 
socio-economic co-operation and reduce economic dependence on the South 
African apartheid regime (Oosthuizen, 2006: 59; Solomon, 2004: 9). Key 
characteristics of the SADCC throughout the 1980s and early 1990s included a 
decentralised approach in which each member state was allocated a sector or 
sub-sector to coordinate from home with a dominant focus upon national 
sovereignty and closely linked to the focus upon state rather than human 
security (Oosthuizen, 2006: 63; Solomon, 2004: 10).  
In seeking to address several of the organisational and structural 
challenges to the FLS and SADCC, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was established in 1992 as an international body with a legal persona 
and the successor to the SADCC, founded upon the SADC Windhoek Declaration 
and the SADC Treaty (Oosthuizen, 2006: 70; Nathan, 2006: 607). With the 
inclusion of South Africa in 1994, SADC is described as having become the focal 
point for stabilization and regeneration in the Southern African region (Breslin et 
al, 2002: 1). The security dimension constitutes one of the two overarching 
objectives for SADC, outlined in Article 5(c) of the SADC Treaty which states its 
objective to promote and defend peace and security in the region (SADC, 1992; 
Oosthuizen, 2006: 39). SADC launched the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security (OPDS) in 1996. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-
Operation was adopted in 2001, providing a framework and mechanisms to 
support peace and security objectives of SADC (CCR, 2007: 19; Oosthuizen, 2006: 
279). Furthermore, the Mutual Defence Pact was approved by the Summit in 
2003 with the objective “to operationalise the mechanisms of the Organ for 
mutual cooperation in defence and security matters” (SADC, 2003). In 2004, the 
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was adopted “designed to be the 
operational side of the organisation’s security structure, the OPDSC” (van 
Nieuwkerk, 2007: 85). However, it can be said that it is only in the past decade 
that a comprehensive plan for peace and security management, including 
principles for democracy and human rights, within the SADC region has 
developed and become internalised within the organisation (Cawthra, 2010.  
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Whilst SADC faced numerous challenges within the first decade of its 
establishment, a normative and ideational shift can be identified within the 
organisation, similar to the changes within the OAU/AU and the UN 
(Hammerstad, 2005). These changes particularly concern the shift in focus from 
state security to the broadened conceptualisation of human security, as outlined 
in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security and the SIPO (Hammerstad, 
2005: 6-7). The security agenda of SADC therefore “includes domestic instability 
as well as inter-state war, and focuses on non-military causes of instability and 
insecurity” (Hammerstad, 2005: 7). This new security discourse, built upon the 
broadened concept of human security, comes in direct contrast with the 
continued focus upon national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference 
and has consequently become a dilemma within SADC (Hammerstad, 2005: 7). 
Nyirabu explains that “it is this very fear emanating from loss of national 
sovereignty that has compounded attempts at creating successful regional 
integration” (Nyirabu, 2004: 26). Whilst ECOWAS and the AU have taken a more 
explicit stance on the issue of non-interference versus non-indifference, this 
issue remains a central challenge to the security architecture within SADC. SADC 
has, however, been active in addressing political and security challenges in the 
region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and most 
recently Madagascar. The role of SADC in addressing the crisis in Madagascar, as 
the most prominent actor promoting regional peace and security in southern 
Africa as well as serving as part of the AU security architecture, is the foundation 
for the focus upon SADC in this thesis. Furthermore, the normative changes 
within this organisation with regards to how SADC thinks about and approaches 
security challenges is regarded as having evolved the past two decades although 
challenges still remain, particularly with regards to its approach towards the 
principle of non-indifference and its continued focus upon state sovereignty and 
regime security.  
 
3.2 A Normative Approach in the UN? 
 
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco 
and came into force on October 24, 1945. The Charter sought to unite the 
countries of the world following two World Wars and placing emphasis upon the 
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role of the United Nations as an international organisation with the primary role 
of maintaining international peace and security. In discussions with UN officials 
on the normative framework of the UN on unconstitutional changes of 
government, reference to the UN Charter were made and several interviewees 
underlined the issues of promoting human rights, the rule of law and 
constitutional order as well as democracy and good governance as central 
sources which implicate the position of the UN on unconstitutional changes of 
government (Interview with Jagne, 2010; Interview with UN official, 2010a; 
Interview with UN official, 2010b; UNDP, 2010). However, persons interviewed 
for this study confirm that the UN does not have an explicit framework or 
doctrine on unconstitutional changes of government (Interview with Jagne, 
2010; Interview with UN official, 2010a; Interview with Ranaivomanana, 2010; 
Interview with UN official, 2010b; Interview with UN official, 2010c). This is 
supported by a recent study by the International Peace Institute which explicitly 
acknowledges that “in recent years, regional and sub-regional organisations have 
adopted norms rejecting departures from constitutional rule. The UN has not.” 
(Call, 2012: 1).  
Interviews with UN officials explain that the UN has involved itself on the 
issue of unconstitutional changes of government through supporting and 
implementing the decisions of regional organisations, contributing to and 
providing input on documents and decisions formulated by regional 
organisations in addressing unconstitutional changes of government and in 
recent years also taking part in International Contact Groups that have been 
established for addressing unconstitutional changes of government in Africa 
(Interview with Jagne, 2010; Interview with Matlosa, 2010). In tracing UN 
responses to unconstitutional changes of government, it is found that the UN has 
rarely been involved in such cases. It is only recently that the UN has begun to 
involve itself, and then usually in partnership with regional and sub-regional 
organisations. The following section seeks to identify whether the UN has 
developed any normative approach towards unconstitutional changes of 
government, to further assess whether a norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government is salient within the UN. We seek to identify policy 
documents, decisions and mandates in place which may depict the 
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institutionalisation of a normative approach toward this issue, as well as actions 
taken by the UN in earlier cases of constitutional crises. Chapter Four will then 
assess the UN response to the case of Madagascar. It is on the basis of these 
findings that we seek to answer the question of whether a normative approach 
towards unconstitutional changes of government is at all salient within the UN, 
and how this norm has emerged and developed within a multi-level international 
system.  
 
3.2 1 Previous Responses by the UN 
 
In seeking to identify a normative approach on unconstitutional changes of 
government within the UN, it is important to consider historical-political factors 
which have contributed to the current position of the UN on this issue area. In 
discussing the UN approach to coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of 
government, several interviewees present various cases of coups d’état and 
unconstitutional changes of government which have served to inform the 
position of the UN on unconstitutional changes of government in recent years. 
Looking at previous cases, we find that the responses by the UN have been 
addressed on a case-by-case basis, with an ad hoc approach to unconstitutional 
changes of government (Interview with UN official, 2010b; Interview with UN 
official, 2010c).  
The coup in Mauritania on August 6, 2008 resulted in the Security Council 
condemning the military overthrow of the democratically elected Government of 
Mauritania and demanding the immediate release of President Abdellahi and the 
“immediate restoration of the legitimate, constitutional, democratic institutions” 
(UNSC, 2008). In addition, the Security Council stated that “the Council expressed 
its opposition to any attempts to change Governments through unconstitutional 
means” (UNSC, 2008). The UN Secretary-General did not however explicitly 
condemn the coup d’état, but expressed “deep regret” and called for respect for 
the rule of law and the immediate restoration of constitutional order in the 
country (UN News Centre, 2008a). In addition, a UN official added that there had 
been a problem between the UN on the one side and the AU and ECOWAS on the 
other, as a result of the Credentials Committee of the UN accepting the 
credentials of Mauritania during the 63rd session of the General Assembly in 
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December, 2008 (Interview with UN official, 2010c; UNGA, 2008). This was 
regarded as a set-back for the AU and ECOWAS who argued that the UN was 
breaking with the solidarity of the organisations who were seeking a common 
position and stance on the case of Mauritania at the time (Interview with UN 
official, 2010c).  
Following the death of long-term ruler General Lansana Conté in the 
Republic of Guinea in December 2008, a military junta seized power announcing 
the dissolution of the government and parliament and suspending the 
Constitution in the Republic of Guinea (Souaré, 2009b). Whilst the AU and 
ECOWAS quickly took a strong stance, condemning the coup and suspending 
Guinea from the activities of the respective organisations until constitutional 
order is restored, no statement was made by the UN following the coup in Guinea 
(Souaré, 2009b; Imisim and Taiwo, 2009). The UN however involved itself in 
mediation and negotiation processes, following decisions made by the AU and 
ECOWAS including the establishment of an International Contact Group on 
Guinea (ISS, 2009b).   
The unconstitutional overthrow of the president in Honduras in 2009 
resulted in a statement by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressing 
“deep concern” over the arrest of the constitutional president, President Zelaya, 
and urging the reinstatement of the democratically elected representatives of the 
country and full respect for human rights (Reuters, 2009a; UN News Centre, 
2009a). This was further supported by the UN General Assembly adopting a 
resolution explicitly condemning the coup d’état in Honduras stating that the 
coup has “interrupted the democratic and constitutional order and the legitimate 
exercise of power in Honduras” (UN News Centre, 2009b; UNGA, 2009a). A UN 
official explained in an interview that the UN General Assembly rarely addresses 
cases of unconstitutional changes of government, and that the case in Honduras 
was one of very few instances when the General Assembly  made a statement on 
cases of coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of government (Interview 
with UN official, 2010c). 
The recent study by the International Peace Institute (Call, 2012) 
supports the claim that the UN does not have a normative framework in place to 
address unconstitutional changes of government. Rarely has the General 
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Assembly addressed it, and the Security Council has been inconsistent in 
addressing it. The wording of the UNSG also differs on a case-by-case basis, 
expressing deep regret and concern in most cases. These findings were 
supported in an interview with a UN official who has worked closely on these 
issues (Interview with UN official, 2010c).  
 
3.2.2 A Change in the UN Approach 
 
Findings show that the UN does not currently have any doctrine or normative 
framework in place which explicitly outlines its position on unconstitutional 
changes of government. This assumption has also been supported in an internal 
review performed by the UN in 2009, a document which has not yet been 
publicized but which a UN official discussed in an interview (Interview with UN 
official, 2010c). However, important steps have been made within the past years. 
These steps forward by the UN are explained to come largely as a result of recent 
instances of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa (Interview with 
UN official, 2010c). In addition, the UN acknowledgement of the comprehensive 
normative framework of the AU seems also to be an important factor for the UN.  
 It is particularly in the year 2009 that the UN has made steps forward in 
addressing its position on constitutional crises. Several interviewees point to the 
Security Council Presidential Statement which expressed deep concern over the 
resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in a few African countries 
(UNSC, 2009a). This statement came following the submission of a draft 
presidential statement to Council members prepared by Uganda in close 
consultation with Libya and Burkina Faso, and regarded as “a coordinated 
African initiative” (UNSC, 2009b). The Security Council Report on this draft 
presidential statement underlines that “the willingness and ability of the AU PSC 
to act in concert against coups on the African continent, in recent times, stand in 
contrast to the lack of early and unanimous Council condemnation of coups 
d’état” (UNSC, 2009b: 4). The purpose of the draft presidential statement was to 
support the Decision of the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government on 
the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups d’état in Africa, 3 February 2009, 
pointing to cases such as Mauritania and Guinea (AU, 2009a; UNSC, 2009b). In 
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this regard, one key issue outlined in this report concerned “whether and how to 
articulate support for the 3 February AU decision condemning the resurgence of 
coups d’état in Africa” (UNSC, 2009b). Secondly, the report discusses “whether 
the Council should do more to streamline processes and decisions to lend its 
political leverage to relevant decisions and peacemaking efforts of the AU and 
further develop partnerships with regional organisations along similar lines in 
the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter” (UNSC, 2009b: 3). Lastly, the report 
also discusses “whether the Council should consider the desirability of taking a 
more active role in seeking to deter coups d’état in specific countries and 
encouraging or supporting mediation, or similar activities, at early stages” 
(UNSC, 2009b: 3).  
 As a result, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on 5 May, 
2009, “expressing its deep concern over the resurgence of unconstitutional 
changes of Government in a few African countries” (UNSC 2009a; UNSC, 2009c). 
The statement further emphasized the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, whilst also 
recalling “that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, 
consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, can improve 
collective security”. The Security Council also welcomed “the continuing 
important efforts of the African Union and subregional organizations, consistent 
with Security Council resolutions and decisions, to settle conflicts, promote 
human rights, democracy, rule of law and constitutional order in Africa”. It 
welcomed the decision of the AU at its twelfth-ordinary session expressing 
concern and condemnation of the resurgence of coups d’état which was regarded 
as not only constituting “a dangerous political downturn and serious setback to 
the democratic processes, but could also pose a threat to peace, security and 
stability on the continent”. Lastly, the presidential statement “welcomes 
preventive measures undertaken by the African Union and subregional 
organizations against unconstitutional changes of Government” (UNSC 2009a; 
UNSC, 2009c). 
In discussions with several interviewees, this presidential statement 
marked an important step forward by the Security Council in directly addressing 
unconstitutional changes of government (Interview with anonymous source, 
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2010; Interview with UN official, 2010a; Interview with UN official, 2010c). This 
issue was also addressed at the 6157th meeting of the Security Council, when top 
UN officials addressing challenges in the West African region emphasized that 
“[c]oups d’état are illegitimate, constituting a severe setback for democratization 
and a threat to national cohesion and stability, with significant subregional 
implications” (UNSC, 2009d). In this statement, it was also underlined by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office in 
West Africa that amongst the challenges to peace and security in West Africa “the 
resurgence of unconstitutional or violent changes of government was one of the 
most alarming threats” recalling the statement by the President of the Security 
Council on 5 May 2009 (UNSC, 2009d; UNSC, 2009c).  
These developments show that the UN has had to take a stronger stance 
and directly address recent cases of unconstitutional changes of government. 
Whilst it has previously responded on a case-by-case basis, the issue has been 
raised and the Security Council and/or General Assembly have been challenged 
to clarify its normative approach. Not least by the AU and representatives of 
members states of the AU. As a result, the UN has initialized an internal review to 
clarify and perhaps develop a normative framework on unconstitutional changes 
of government.  
 
3.2.3 An Internal Review of the UN  
 
In late 2009, an internal review was conducted by the UN to assess the 
development a norm based principled approach on unconstitutional changes of 
government by the UN (Interview with UN official, 2010c). This decision is 
explained to have been triggered by the recent experiences of the UN in 
addressing (or not) instances of coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of 
government including Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar and Honduras (Interview 
with UN official, 2010c). As a result, two particular points have come out of the 
internal review. Firstly, it has been recommended that the UN Secretary-General 
should promote a norm based principled approach on unconstitutional changes 
of government (Interview with UN official, 2010c). It was acknowledged that the 
current approach has been done on an ad hoc basis, pointing also to the debate 
on “good” versus “bad” coups (Ikome, 2007; Collier, 2009). Secondly, the internal 
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review also addresses the issue of coordination and information sharing with the 
aim of strengthening the collective response of all sections of the UN to instances 
of unconstitutional changes of government (Interview with UN official, 2010c). 
To ensure coherence by all branches of the UN, both operational as well as 
strategic mechanisms are regarded as necessary, which may also serve to 
strengthen the collaborative efforts of the UN with other international, regional 
and sub-regional organisations (Interview with UN official, 2010c).  
In discussing this internal review, a UN official explains that the UN does 
not have a principled approach and schedule for condemnation, suspension, 
threatening of and then imposing sanctions upon norm-breakers as the AU has. 
This is however an important point for the UN, with regards to the degree of 
flexibility the UN may have in addressing these cases. The UN official explains 
that the UN wishes to develop a principled stance expressing clearly that the UN 
is against coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of government, eliminating 
any “good” versus “bad” coups debate as discussed by Ikome (2007). A coup is a 
coup. However, the UN also wishes to engage constructively with the authorities 
on the ground to support the return to constitutional order (Interview with UN 
official, 2010c; Call, 2012). This raises the issue of how stringent a UN position 
and strategy on unconstitutional changes of government should and could be. 
The UN Security Council report on the draft presidential statement addressing 
the resurgence of coups d’état in Africa points this out when it states that 
“certain Council members (e.g. the UK, the US and France) are reluctant to make 
condemnation of coups an automatic Council practice and would prefer that the 
Council reserve the right to determine on a case-by-case basis when an incident 
of coup d’état should be characterised as a threat to peace and security” (UNSC, 
2009b: 4). In further developing a normative framework on unconstitutional 
changes of government there is a desire by the UN to take a clear stance 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government whilst also allowing for a 
degree of flexibility. However, the UN official makes it clear that in developing a 
normative approach, the UN cannot continue with business as usual when coups 
or instances of unconstitutional changes of government occur (Interview with 
UN official, 2010c). As a result, the message promoted within the internal review 
is that there is now a clear effort on the part of the UN to formulate a coherent 
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UN strategy and position on coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of 
government. These findings show that the UN does not currently have a norm 
based principled approach to unconstitutional changes of government, but that 
the issue is being addressed within the UN and may result in a more coherent 
and explicit framework by the UN in the future. 
 
 
3.3 A Normative Approach in the AU? 
 
The OAU/AU has significantly developed and institutionalised its role as a central 
regional body addressing peace and security in Africa, particularly within the 
past two decades. Within the context of the end of the Cold War, the release of 
Nelson Mandela from prison and the resurgence of intra-state conflicts in Africa, 
the OAU began to lay a foundation for its role in addressing conflicts in Africa in 
the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the 
Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World in 1990. The popular 
participation of peoples in processes of government and development to 
promote an environment which guarantees human rights and the observance of 
the rule of law, as well as peaceful resolutions to conflict, were important issue 
areas outlined in this document (OAU, 1990). The document also laid the 
foundations for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution established in 1993 (hereafter referred to as the Mechanism). The 
Mechanism was established “to ensure that Africa through the Organisation of 
African Unity plays a central role in bringing about peace and stability in the 
Continent” (OAU, 1993). Engel and Porto (2010) underline that the OAU at this 
point began developing a normative approach toward unconstitutional changes 
of government, when a sub-committee of the Mechanism was designated 
towards addressing this issue area. This sub-committee would consequently gain 
particular importance at the OAU Council of Ministers in 1999, prior the 
establishment of the AU (Engel and Porto, 2010: 7).  
 A central shortcoming of the OAU was however the limited ability to 
address internal conflicts as a result of the principle of non-intervention, 
described “as one of its ‘unshakeable’ founding principles” (de Coning, 1997). 
This principle greatly limited both the OAU and African countries in general to 
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sufficiently address internal conflicts and civil wars in Africa. Furthermore, and 
perhaps largely as a result, external actors played a central role in addressing 
conflicts in Africa in the early 1990’s, exemplified by the role of the Portuguese in 
facilitating negotiations in Angola from 1990 to 1992 as well as by the UN in 
1993 to 1995, the role of Italy in mediating the end of the civil war in 
Mozambique in 1991 to 1992, and the role of the U.S. in Ethiopia in 1990 to 1991 
and in Somalia in 1992 to 1993 (de Coning, 1997).  
In cases where conflicts did require international intervention, the OAU 
underlined the role of the UN and cooperative measures under the UN Charter, as 
well as the coordination of activities with African regional and sub-regional 
organisations and with neighbouring countries to the conflict. It is within this 
context that the OAU was re-established to become the AU, to strengthen the 
organisation as an important regional actor as well as to strengthen the mandate 
and policies of the organisation.  
 
3.3.1 From the OAU to the AU: Strengthening the Normative Framework  
 
At the Thirty-Third Summit of the OAU in Harare, Zimbabwe, in June 1997, the 
agenda initially concerned progress made on the continent in achieving peace in 
areas such as Liberia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
(Meldrum, 1997). However, the coup in Sierra Leone during this time resulted in 
the issue being raised in the OAU on how to address coups and to consider 
actions to be taken against the coup makers (Meldrum, 1997). Both the 
Secretary-General of the UN at the time, Kofi Annan, and the OAU chairman at the 
time, President Robert Mugabe, directly addressed this issue. Secretary-General 
Annan stated “‘[n]eighboring states, regional groups and international 
organizations must all play their parts to restore Sierra Leone’s constitutional 
and democratic government’” (Meldrum, 1997). President Mugabe reiterated 
these sentiments, stating “‘[c]oup-plotters and those who overthrow democratic 
governments will find it more difficult to get recognition from us. Democracy is 
getting stronger in Africa and we now have a definitive attitude against coups’” 
(Meldrum, 1997). As a result, the OAU Summit in 1997 began to develop a clear 
stance on coups d’état and ultimately upon the broader issue of unconstitutional 
changes of government on the continent. As Souaré explains, “[f]or almost the 
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first time, African leaders jointly and unequivocally condemned and rejected 
coups and any unconstitutional change of government on the continent and 
resolved to maintain a united official stance on this issue in the future…” (Souaré, 
2009a).  
The Algiers Summit held by the OAU in 1999 also placed the issue of 
unconstitutional changes of government on the agenda, outlined in the decision 
“that Member States whose Governments came to power through 
unconstitutional means after the Harare Summit, should restore constitutional 
legality before the next Summit” (OAU, 1999). The Algiers Summit requested that 
the Secretary-General remain observant of unconstitutional activities taking 
place within member states and called upon a report on progress being made on 
this issue for the next Summit to be held, leading up to the Lomé Declaration of 
2000 as well as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance of 
2007.  
The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in July 2000 in 
Lomé, Togo, establishing the legal-institutional framework for the 
transformation from the OAU to the AU (Engel and Porto, 2010: 2). The 
Constitutive Act is described as “giving it [the AU] a radically new vision and 
mission, a set of clearly defined objectives and responsibilities” (Engel and Porto, 
2010: 2). This document serves to institutionalise the AU stance on 
unconstitutional changes of government, outlined in Article 4(p) of the 
Constitutive Act stating that one of the principles of the AU is the condemnation 
and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (AU, 2000). In addition, 
Article 30 states that “Governments which shall come to power through 
unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the 
Union” (AU, 2000). From the establishment of the AU then, a normative approach 
is clearly outlined in the Constitutive Act laying the foundation for the further 
development of a normative framework on this issue.  
The Thirty-Sixth Summit of the OAU takes another step forward in 
addressing unconstitutional changes of government with the “Declaration on the 
Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government” 
(OAU, 2000). This declaration, referred to as the Lomé Declaration, is a second 
key document on the norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government 
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in the OAU/AU (Interview with Kambudzi, 2010; Souaré, 2009; Engel and Porto, 
2010). To further strengthen a clear normative framework on unconstitutional 
changes of government, The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance of 2007 (hereafter referred to as the Charter) greatly strengthens 
the OAU/AU doctrine on unconstitutional changes. The central points of Lomé 
Declaration and the African Charter will be considered together, as they both 
provide the current framework of the AU on unconstitutional changes.  
Firstly, these documents point out a range of guiding principles and 
common values of the OAU/AU. These include the respect for democratic 
principles, democratic change and human rights; free, fair and regular elections; 
the institutionalisation of transparency, accountability and participatory 
democracy; respect for the constitution and the principle of the rule of law; 
separation of powers and independence of the judiciary; and the condemnation 
and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (OAU, 2000; AU, 
2007).  
Both the Lomé Declaration and the Charter define situations considered to 
be an unconstitutional change of government as 1) a military coup d’état against 
a democratically elected government; 2) intervention by mercenaries to replace 
a democratically elected government; 3) replacement of a democratically elected 
government by armed dissidents or rebels; and 4) the refusal of an incumbent 
government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair 
and regular elections (OAU, 2000; AU, 2007). The Charter adds a fifth situation in 
Article 23(5) as “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal 
instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of 
government” (AU, 2007). Whilst the Lomé Declaration places focus upon how 
governments come into power to prevent individuals and/or groups from 
coming into power unconstitutionally and undemocratically, the Charter takes a 
step further to also focus upon the issue of staying in power on a constitutionally 
legal and democratic basis thereby addressing the issue of retaining power 
constitutionally. These instruments therefore address both unconstitutional 
replacement, as an illegal accession to power, and emplacement, referring to the 
illegal retention of power (Maru, 2012: 68).  
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To operationalise these common values and principles condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government, a range of policy standard responses 
are outlined in the Lomé Declaration and the Charter. Souaré (2009) presents 
these central points in his review of these documents which include, in order, the 
following actions.  
 That the Chairperson of the OAU/AU Commission and the President of the 
AU Commission (AUC) immediately and publicly condemn the act of 
unconstitutional change of government and urge for the speedy recovery 
to constitutional order and also urge for consistency of action at the 
bilateral, inter-state, sub-regional and international levels.  
 The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU convene, as a matter of 
urgency, to discuss the matter.  
 The country where unconstitutional change of government occurred 
should be suspended from participating in the policy organs of the AU 
while the ‘new authorities’ (or the perpetrators of the UCG) are given a 
period of six months to restore constitutional order. This is supported by 
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act stating that “Governments which shall 
come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to 
participate in the activities of the Union” (AU, 2000).  
 During the six-month time period, the AU is to remain seized of the matter 
and “engage with the new authorities with a view to ascertaining their 
intentions regarding the restoration of constitutional order in the country, 
and, in so doing, seek the contribution of African leaders and personalities 
in the form of discreet moral pressure on the perpetrators of the 
unconstitutional change in order to get them to cooperate with the AU in 
its efforts.” Collaboration with the REC to which the country concerned 
belongs is also underlined.  
 After the six-month suspension period, “a range of limited and targeted 
sanctions against the regime that stubbornly refuses to restore 
constitutional order should be instituted, in addition to the continued 
suspension from participation in the AU policy organs.” In implementing 
these sanctions, “the AU should involve all its Member States, RECs and 
the wider international/donor community, including the UN”. It is also 
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noted that the sanctions should not cause disproportionate suffering of 
the citizens in the country concerned.  
 
Article 25 of the Charter further supports these actions as outlined in the 
Lomé Declaration and adds an additional two actions to be taken. In paragraph 
four of Article 25 of the Charter, the AU states that “[t]he perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in 
elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of 
responsibility in political institutions of their State” (AU, 2007; Souaré, 2009). In 
addition, paragraph 6 of Article 25 states that “[t]he Assembly shall impose 
sanctions on any Member State that is proved to have instigated or supported 
unconstitutional change of government in another state in conformity with 
Article 23 of the Constitutive Act” (AU, 2007). These decisions by the Charter 
serve to greater strengthen the zero-tolerance policy by the AU on 
unconstitutional changes of government.  
The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council (the PSC Protocol) adopted in July 2002, and entering into force in 
December 2003, further supports the norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government and reaffirms the position and decisions made in the 
Algiers Summit in 1999 as well as the Lomé Declaration of 2000 in condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government on the continent (AU, 2002; Engel and 
Porto, 2010). Lastly, the Rules of Procedure for the AU Assembly outlines in Rule 
37 action to be taken, including sanctions to be applied, to unconstitutional 
changes of government (Engel and Porto, 2010: 8).  
In sum, we find that the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, the Lomé Declaration 
of 2000 and the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 
(ratified in 2012) provide the main pillars for a robust normative framework on 
unconstitutional changes of government within the African Union.  
 
3.3.2 Recent Developments on the Position of the AU 
 
Following occurrences of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, 
including the case of Madagascar, the AU has shown increased concern on the 
matter highlighted in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Ordinary Sessions of the AU in 
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2009. At the Twelfth Ordinary Session, the AU expresses “deep concern over the 
resurgence of the scourge of coups d’état on the Continent, which constitutes not 
only a dangerous downturn and a serious setback to the democratic processes, 
but also a threat to peace, security and stability on the Continent…” (AU, 2009a). 
The Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the AU in July 2009 follows up with a 
“Decision on the prevention of unconstitutional changes of government and 
strengthening the capacity of the African Union to manage such situations” 
calling for the Chairperson of the Commission to initiate consultations to address 
ways and means of strengthening the capacity of the AU to address the scourge 
of unconstitutional changes of government and calls for a final report with 
comprehensive recommendations on the matter for the Fourteenth Ordinary 
Session of the AU (AU, 2009b). These sessions led to the “Report of the 
Chairperson of the Commission on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage 
such situations” in January 2010 and consequently the “Decision on the 
Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the 
Capacities of the African Union to Manage Such Situations” by the AU Assembly 
in February 2010 (AU, 2010a). This decision reiterates the AU’s total rejection of 
unconstitutional changes of government and also emphasized the need for a 
comprehensive approach to address this issue based on a principle of zero-
tolerance. In addition, the Peace and Security Council held a retreat in Ezulwini, 
Swaziland, in December 2009 to also address “ways and means of strengthening 
the capacity of the AU to deal with the scourge of unconstitutional changes of 
Government in Africa” (AU, 2010b).  
Since the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 
2007 was yet to be ratified at the Fourteenth Ordinary Session of the AU 
Assembly in January-February 2010, the AU sought to further support Article 25 
of the Charter by reiterating the points made in Article 25 in hopes of further 
strengthening the capacities of the AU in addressing unconstitutional changes of 
government. The Decision emphasises the importance that members of the AU as 
well as non-members, and particularly the UN and the General Assembly, do not 
recognize the de facto authorities and provide support for the decisions taken by 
the AU in seeking to take a firm and strong stance on this issue. The AU 
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acknowledges that it is important to receive broad support for AU decisions by 
the international community to avoid action which may undermine the decisions 
of the AU and send conflicting signals to the perpetrators. The use of 
International Contact Groups (ICGs) to secure a return to constitutional order is 
also encouraged, to ensure coordinated efforts and to mobilize support for the 
decisions of the AU from the international community. Lastly, the decision 
reiterates the fundamental role of RECs and their rules and practices in 
addressing unconstitutional changes of government.  
The Peace and Security Council at its 213th Meeting in January 2010 also 
sought to take strong steps toward addressing unconstitutional changes of 
government, stating that “it has become imperative to put in place further 
practical strategies and measures with a view to strengthening the existing 
institutional arrangement for preventing and combating unconstitutional 
changes of Government in Africa” (AU, 2010b). Particularly noting the pending of 
entry into force of the Charter at the time, the PSC reiterated the promotion of 
zero-tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and suggested that the 
AU take an even firmer stance on unconstitutional changes of government. These 
actions include the shortening of the time period perpetrators have to restore 
constitutional order from six months to three months; further elaborate upon the 
Lomé Declaration on regimes that “stubbornly” refuse to restore constitutional 
order, in order to hold any unconstitutional regime/de facto authority fully 
accountable within the framework of AU instruments for combating and 
preventing unconstitutional changes of government; further enhance 
coordination and cooperation between the AU and RECs; accelerate the 
ratification of the Charter; as well as preparing guidelines for preventive 
deployment of AU presence before the breakdown of law and order based on AU 
early warning indicators (AU, 2010b). On the basis of these decisions, the AU has 
made clear its complete and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
government on the continent.  
 
3.4 A Normative Approach in the SADC? 
 
With the creation of SADC and the signing of the SADC Treaty and SADC 
Windhoek Declaration in 1992, the focus of the organisation shifted from “the co-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
ordination of some, mainly national, affairs in a fairly loose association to co-
operation and integration through an international organisation” (Oosthuizen, 
2006: 70). Together with a focus upon deeper economic co-operation and 
integration as well as strengthened regional solidarity, the Windhoek Declaration 
outlines that the framework for co-operation includes enhancing “democracy 
and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human 
rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty” (Oosthuizen, 2006: 71). 
The SADC Treaty similarly outlines its principles including solidarity, peace and 
security as well as democracy, human rights and the rule of law (SADC, 2001; 
Oosthuizen, 2006: 302). 
  The SADC Treaty encompasses two overall objectives which are the 
promotion of socio-economic growth and socio-economic development as well as 
the “the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and democracy, through 
regional co-operation and integration” (Oosthuizen, 2006: 121). The SADC 
Treaty of 1992 differs from the amended Treaty of 2001 in that it paid less 
attention to the issue of democracy, stating in its political and security objectives 
in Article 5 (b) and (c) of the 1992 Treaty that SADC “shall evolve common 
political values, systems and institutions” and “promote and defence peace and 
security” (Oosthuizen, 2006: 72; SADC, 1992). In contrast, the amended 2001 
Treaty states in Article 5 (b) and (c) that it seeks to “promote common political 
values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through 
institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective” and “consolidate, 
defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability” (Oosthuizen, 
2006: 280; SADC, 2001). Similar to the language depicting the values and 
principles of the UN, the terms “democracy, [democratic] elections, human rights, 
the rule of law, and good governance” are therefore found to be appearing more 
frequently in SADC sources (Oosthuizen, 2006: 301). However, in contrast to the 
AU Constitutive Act, the SADC Treaty does not explicitly address the issue of 
coups d’état or unconstitutional changes of government in its text.  
 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was created at the SADC 
Extraordinary Summit on 28 June 1996 and “has developed into a critical 
structure whose function has become the major determinant of the direction that 
peace and security in the sub-region will take” (Ngoma, 2005: 141). No treaty 
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was drafted at the time, and the objectives, principles and institutional 
framework of the body were presented in the Summit communiqué in 1996 
(Oosthuizen, 2006: 85). There were also major disputes particularly with regards 
to whether the Organ and its chairperson would fall under the SADC Summit, 
promoted by South Africa, or whether it would be a relatively autonomous body 
with its own summit, promoted by Zimbabwe (Oosthuizen, 2006: 86). The period 
between 1996 and 2001 therefore consisted of a weak OPDS described “as if the 
OPDS ceased to exist for several years” (Oosthuizen, 2006: 86). With the 
amendment of the SADC Treaty in 2001 however, the Organ was formally 
established in its present form in which the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation, the 2003 Mutual Defence Pact, the SIPO and the 2004 
SADC election guidelines outline the structure, functions, power, and procedures 
of the Organ (Oosthuizen, 2006: 213-214).  
Together with the SADC Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation provides the general basis for political and security co-
operation in the sub-region (Oosthuizen, 2006: 279). Amongst its objectives, the 
Protocol outlines in Article 2 the aim to “protect and safeguard the development 
of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, 
intra-state conflict- inter-state conflict and aggression”; “promote political co-
operation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and 
institutions”; and “promote the development of democratic institutions and 
practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of 
universal human rights…” (SADC, 2001b). In specifying the areas in which the 
Organ has jurisdiction to resolve intra-state conflicts amongst its members, the 
Protocol regards “a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a 
State” as a significant intra-state conflict under Chapter 2 of the Protocol (SADC, 
2001b). The Protocol also reaffirms the primary role of the UN in promoting and 
maintaining international peace and security and of the AU Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Co-operation and coordination 
with these organisations is therefore recognised as important in promoting 
peace and security in the region as “political, defence and security matters 
transcend national and regional boundaries” (SADC, 2001b). The methods which 
the Organ may employ to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by peaceful 
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means include “preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good 
offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal” (SADC, 2001b). 
On the topic of enforcement action, the Protocol empowers the Chairperson 
acting on behalf of the Ministerial Committee to recommend such action to the 
Summit whilst recognising such action as a last resort and in accordance with 
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter with authorization from the UN Security 
Council.  
The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) is meant to be the 
implementation plan for the Protocol and divides the security priorities outlined 
in the objectives of the Protocol into four areas, namely the political sector, the 
defence sector, the state security sector and the public security sector (Van 
Schalkwyk, 2005: 120). The SADC Summit approved the SIPO in August 2003 and 
it was officially launched in August 2004, and is based upon the objectives and 
common agenda of Article 5 of the amended Treaty of 2001 (Oosthuizen, 2006: 
127; SADC, 2004). The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
serves as SADC’s main socioeconomic development plan, approved by the 
Summit in August 2003 and launched in March 2004 (Oosthuizen, 2006: 125). 
These serve as key instruments for SADC in promoting socioeconomic 
development as well as political and security co-operation in the region 
(Oosthuizen, 2006: 125, 127). These documents reflect the common language 
within SADC on the promotion of democracy and good governance, 
transparency, respect for the rule of law and respect for human rights as 
prerequisites and challenges for SADC in seeking to promote the main objectives 
of socioeconomic development and peace, security and democracy as outlined in 
the SADC Treaty (Oosthuizen, 2006: 303; SADC, 2004; SADC, 2004b). But 
unconstitutional changes of government are not explicitly mentioned.  
The Mutual Defence Pact was provided for in the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation in Article 2 (2)(h) which states as an objective 
to “consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a 
Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats” (SADC, 2001b). 
Article 2 of the Mutual Defence Pact states as its objective “to operationalise the 
mechanisms of the Organ for mutual cooperation and security matters” (SADC, 
2003). Supporting the commitment of SADC to function as a collective defence 
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organisation, the Mutual Defence Pact commits “members to (unspecified) 
mutual assistance against attack” (Möller, 2009). This document touches upon 
the issue of unconstitutional changes of government, when it specifies that 
destabilising acts include “any act or activity aimed at changing the constitutional 
order of a State Party through unconstitutional means” (SADC, 2003). However, 
the focus here is upon assuring that member states do not undertake such acts 
against other member states. As Article 8 of the Pact states, “state parties 
undertake not to nurture, harbour or support any person, group of persons or 
institutions whose aim is to destabilise the political, military, territorial and 
economic or social security of a State Party” (SADC, 2003). The Pact thereby 
focuses upon external destabilising factors rather than destabilising factors 
within a member state, reflecting the traditional focus upon regime security 
rather than human security within SADC.  
A SADC official explains that the general position of SADC is that it does 
not tolerate unconstitutional changes of government (Interview with Sangiza, 
2010). This general position of SADC is reflected in various cases, for example in 
the case of Lesotho in 1998. South Africa and Botswana deployed troops to 
Lesotho, at the request of the Prime Minister in hopes to stabilize a domestic 
crisis and to avoid a coup (Nathan, 2006: 612). This intervention however led to 
the deaths of both South African as well as Basotho soldiers, and resulted in a 
wave of criticism and the view that the intervention was a political and military 
disaster (Nathan, 2006: 612). In seeking to explain why South Africa and 
Botswana intervened, one main issue was namely that the intervention “flowed 
from a SADC decision to not permit coups and other unconstitutional changes of 
government in southern Africa” (Nathan, 2006: 613). Similarly, SADC responded 
to a coup attempt in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 10 June 2004 by 
stating its “deep concern and dismay” over the coup attempt. In the same press 
release from the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) of the 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, SADC states that it 
“will not tolerate and will not allow unconstitutional change of governments in 
the region” (SADC, 2004c).  
SADC officials explain that the general position of SADC is that it does not 
tolerate unconstitutional changes of government in the region (Interview with 
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Sangiza, 2010; Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). However, both confirm that SADC 
does not have an explicit framework on unconstitutional changes of government 
(Interview with Sangiza, 2010; Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). Furthermore, both 
reiterate that the member states of SADC are also members of the AU. They 
explain that SADC accepts the policies and legal instruments of the AU and that 
SADC therefore also bases its position on unconstitutional changes of 
government on the policies and documents of the AU (Interviw with Sangiza, 
2010; Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). But an explicit normative framework on 
unconstitutional changes of government within SADC is currently not in place.  
 
3.5 From Policy to Practice 
 
Background reviews of the UN, AU and SADC show that there have been clear 
normative shifts within all organisations in the post-Cold War era. The shift from 
a focus upon regime security to human security particularly exemplifies this 
change in normative approaches toward peace and security on the African 
continent. In seeking to identify the emergence and salience of a normative 
approach toward unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, AU and 
SADC, it is also clear that a normative approach is developing although to varying 
degrees within each organisation. We find that a norm condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government has clearly evolved and become 
institutionalised through key political documents in the AU, whilst a strong 
normative framework is not yet in place within the UN and SADC. 
A review of the UN shows that the UN does not currently have a norm-
based, principled approach toward unconstitutional changes of government. UN 
responses are shown to be taken on an ad hoc basis, with a preference amongst 
several member states to retain this degree of flexibility and consider instances 
of unconstitutional changes of government on a case-by-case basis. The manner 
in which the UN involves itself therefore largely concerns support for decisions 
and actions taken by regional and sub-regional organisations and involvement in 
forum such as International Contact Groups to support and help coordinate the 
efforts of the regional and sub-regional organisations. A clear and structured 
response to Madagascar by the UN is therefore not expected on the basis of these 
findings. As a UN official explains, there is no principled approach or schedule for 
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condemnation, suspension, threatening of and then imposing sanctions upon 
norm-breakers as the AU has. What can be expected is that the UN offers support 
to the efforts of regional and sub-regional organisations, to mediation efforts, 
electoral and technical assistance and/or financial and logistical support.  
In contrast to the UN, a clear normative framework on unconstitutional 
changes of government has clearly emerged and become salient within the AU. 
The main documents outlining the policies of the AU on unconstitutional changes 
of government include the Constitutive Act of 2000, the Lomé Declaration of 
2000, the AU Charter of 2007 as well as the more recent AU decision on the 
prevention of unconstitutional changes of government at the Fourteenth 
Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly and the Ezulwini Framework from the 
213th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council in 2010. These documents 
provide a clear overview of the actions we may expect the AU to take in instances 
of unconstitutional changes of government. First, the AU is to immediately and 
publicly condemn the act of unconstitutional changes of government and urge 
the return to constitutional order. This should be followed by the suspension of 
the country concerned from participating in the policy organs of the AU, while 
the new authorities are given a period of six months to restore constitutional 
order. Following suspension, the AU is to remain seized of the matter and engage 
with the new authorities to ensure and support the return to constitutional 
order. If by six months constitutional order is not restored, the AU is to impose a 
range of limited and targeted sanctions with the involvement and support of the 
relevant RECs and of the international community, and particularly the UN. In 
addition, the AU has decided that perpetrators are not allowed to participate in 
elections to restore constitutional order or hold any position of responsibility in 
the political institutions of the state. And lastly, the AU is to impose sanctions 
upon any member state which has instigated or supported unconstitutional 
changes of government in another state. This normative framework results in the 
expectation that when instances of unconstitutional changes of government 
occur in Africa, the AU will take a clear and strong stance against it and respond 
on the basis of actions to be taken as outlined in the policy documents above.  
 A review of SADC depicts a similarity to the UN, in that SADC does not 
have a clear and structured framework guiding a norm-based response to 
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unconstitutional changes of government. However, interviewees from within 
SADC have made it clear that SADC does not accept any unconstitutional change 
of government in the region. This position does indicate that SADC will respond 
to instances of unconstitutional changes of government, although guidelines for a 
SADC response are yet to be put in place. The manner in which SADC does chose 
to respond has furthermore been a point of focus in studies of how SADC 
addresses security challenges in the region. A main distinction amongst the 
member states of SADC has concerned pacific versus militaristic approaches to 
regional security (Nathan, 2006: 606). This has been reflected in the process of 
developing the SADC regional security policy and particularly the OPDS, in which 
it was found that “it was clear that many states did not support the anti-
militaristic and democratic norms” (Nathan, 2006: 608-609). These differences 
have therefore led to a discussion on whether there are clear common political 
and security values and practices amongst the members of SADC (Nathan, 2006; 
Tavares, 2010: 59-60). In looking towards where decision-making takes place in 
addressing regional security issues, we find that SADC Summits remain the main 
source for addressing regional security issues and taking decisions on how to 
respond and take action in the region. Whilst SADC does not have clear 
guidelines on how to address unconstitutional changes of government, it is at the 
Summit level meetings that we expect to find the SADC position and response to 
the case of unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar. Building upon 
these findings, the following chapter will assess the responses by the UN, AU and 
SADC to the case of unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar.   
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Chapter 4 
The Response to Madagascar 
 
4.1 Background to the Political Crisis 
 
The political crisis in Madagascar resulting in the unconstitutional change of 
government in March 2009 was not the first time Madagascar experienced 
political instability. Since its independence in 1960, but particularly from the 
1970s, Madagascar has experienced recurring political instability and violence 
(Randrianja and Ellis, 2009: 187; Maunganidze, 2009: 1). The country’s 
instability has been a result largely of economic crisis, poverty, contested 
constitutional order, partisan politics and ethnic tensions (API, 2009: 6). The 
manner in which the now ousted President, Marc Ravalomanana, came into 
power in 2001 is a clear example of this. Ravalomanana first entered politics in 
1999 when he became mayor of the capital city Antananarivo, and had only been 
in politics for three years when he became a candidate for the presidential 
elections in 2001. The incumbent president at the time, Didier Ratsiraka, and the 
former president, Albert Zafy, were also candidates. The elections in 2001 were 
held during a time in which the established political parties were “more or less 
devalued by corruption and nepotism” (Randrianja and Ellis, 2009: 206). 
Ravalomanana was a successful businessman who had become widely popular 
for making improvements to the capital, was admired for his willingness to stand 
up to government bullying and also received considerable support from the 
churches (Randrianja and Ellis, 2009: 206). Following the first round of elections, 
neither Ravalomanana nor Ratsiraka received an absolute majority of the votes 
cast, resulting in the High Constitutional Court (HCC) calling for a second round 
of voting (Cornwell, 2003: 42). This led Ravalomanana to call for a recount whilst 
Ratsiraka said he was prepared to contest a second round. Following increased 
tensions between the two rivals, the situation in Madagascar was seen as 
culminating into “nothing less than a low-intensity civil war” (Cornwell, 2003: 
42; Randrianja and Ellis, 2009: 208). Following a series of actions in which 
Ravalomanana declared himself president and had himself sworn in, 
Ravalomanana gained more and more power within the government, reflecting 
the waning influence of Ratsiraka (Cornwell, 2003: 44). In late April 2002, the 
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HCC declared that Ravalomanana had won with a majority of 51.46% of the votes 
(Cornwell, 2003: 45). Ratsiraka flew into exile in France, and numerous states 
began to recognize Ravalomanana as the head of state (Cornwell, 2003: 44, 47, 
48). On the request of the international community to remove any doubt of 
Ravalomanana’s legitimacy as head of state, parliamentary elections were held in 
December 2002 in which Ravalomanana won a clear victory in which he and his 
allies received 132 of 160 seats (Cornwell, 2003: 49). Ravalomanana therefore 
emerged as President of Madagascar.  
The 2006 elections however were “undermined by incidents of electoral 
violence and unrest, plunging Madagascar into a near permanent state of 
political instability” (Zounmenou, 2009). Ravalomanana was re-elected with 
54.97% of the votes, yet evidence of autocratic leadership and democratic retreat 
were increasing with increased public discontent with the government (API, 
2009: 8). In 2007, the government organised a constitutional referendum which 
provided additional powers to the head of state followed by legislative elections 
in the same year to align the legislature with the amended constitution, giving 
Ravalomanana total control of the legislature with 106 of 127 seats (API, 2009: 
8). These actions served to further strengthen the powers of Ravalomanana and 
his I Love Madagascar (TIM) party whilst at the same time increasing discontent 
with the government amongst many voters. The period between the elections in 
2006 and 2008 showed increased discontent and should have served as an early 
warning for Ravalomanana “to quickly move towards an inclusive political 
dispensation” (API, 2009: 8). These political developments and the history of 
political instability in the country should perhaps also have served as early 
warning signals for the international community in recognizing the possibility of 
renewed instability and conflict. A UN official however revealed that there was 
little concern with the internal conditions of the country at the time, exemplified 
by the decision of the Assembly of the AU in early February 2009 that 
Madagascar host the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly (Interview 
with UN Official, 2010a; AU, 2009c). In addition, following the tremendous 
economic setback from the 2001 elections, the country was showing economic 
development and between 2000 and 2007 Madagascar’s Human Development 
Index (HDI) rose 1.14% annually (HDR, 2009).  
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Ravalomanana was accused of mixing his personal business with state 
politics, and through his company Tiko took over the running of several former 
state-owned enterprises (Maunganidze, 2009: 3). Another source of provocation 
was the purchase of a private jet in 2008 at the cost of sixty million dollars to be 
used as the president’s official aircraft (Maunganidze, 2009: 3; Rasmussen, 
2010). Lastly, Ravalomanana was brokering a deal with a Korean company to 
lease 3.2 million acres of land for agricultural production to meet Korea’s 
demand which constituted more than half of Madagascar’s cultivatable land 
(Walt, 2008; API, 2009: 7, 11). This was taking place during a time in which the 
country of Madagascar faced “grinding poverty, joblessness, widening social 
inequalities, poor service delivery and corruption” (API, 2009: 8). The Human 
Development Index of 2009 ranked Madagascar at 145 out of 182 countries, with 
a Human Poverty Index ranking of 113 out of 135 countries with data (HDR, 
2009).  
The local elections in 2007 introduced Andry Rajoelina to the political 
stage, in which he won a landslide victory of sixty-three percent of the total vote 
for mayor of Antananarivo over the handpicked candidate of President 
Ravalomanana (API, 2009: 9). Before becoming mayor, Rajoelina had been a disc 
jockey and event organisor in the capital and set up his own radio and television 
station called VIVA, raising his profile in the country (API, 2009: 9). During a time 
in which there was increasing discontent with how Ravalomanana was running 
the country, Rajoelina capitalised upon these sentiments and “embarked on a 
spirited political campaign to challenge the authority of the Ravalomanana 
government” (API, 2009: 9). An official in the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) explained that the consequent uprise and 
political unrest was perceived not necessarily as pro-Rajoelina support but 
rather as anti-Ravalomanana sentiment, where Rajoelina represented the 
frustrations of the people and thereby gained support for spear-heading an anti-
Ravalomanana movement (Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010a).  
It is within this context that Rajoelina’s television station broadcast an 
interview with former president Didier Ratsiraka in which Ratsiraka “lamented 
the state of governance in Madagascar and blamed the country’s economic woes 
on his successor, Marc Ravalomanana” (Maunganidze, 2009: 2). As a result, the 
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government ordered a temporary shutdown of VIVA which further reinforced 
the perception of Ravalomanana’s authoritarianism in the country (API, 2009: 9). 
This led Rajoelina to begin publicly criticising Ravalomanana and his 
administration and rally up political protests “to tap on growing discontentment 
against the TIM leadership” (Maunganidze, 2009: 2; API, 2009: 9). The closing of 
the VIVA television station is therefore regarded as the catalyst for the 
consequent political and security crisis in Madagascar and the opportunity for 
Rajoelina to begin mustering oppositional support against the Ravalomanana 
government.  
 
4.2 Increasing Tensions in Early 2009 
 
Following the closing of VIVA, the months of January and February 2009 showed 
an increase in violence, looting, loss of lives and political unrest in the country. 
On January 26, Rajoelina called for his supporters to hold a public protest which 
led protesters to take to the streets of Antananarivo marking the beginning of 
violent conflict and increasing death tolls in the capital city (Maunganidze, 2009; 
Huffington Post, 2009). Several properties linked to the government and to 
Ravalomanana were set on fire and on January 28 another protest was held 
resulting in another round of violence raising the approximate death count to 
between thirty and fifty people “marking the beginning of large-scale aggression 
towards the government” (Maunganidze, 2009: 4). On January 31 Rajoelina 
unilaterally declared himself President of the Higher Authority of Transition and 
called for Ravalomanana to resign (BBC, 2009a; IRIN News 2010a). Rajoelina 
was consequently removed from office as mayor on February 3, worsening the 
already volatile situation and leading to another protest outside the presidential 
palace on February 7 (Maunganidze, 2009: 4). The February 7 protest has since 
been referred to as “Red Saturday”, as a result of the presidential guard opening 
fire with live bullets upon the protesters and killing twenty-eight more people 
raising the total number of casualties to one hundred (Maunganidze, 2009: 4). It 
is within this context that “the international community realised that the political 
crisis in Madagascar had reached boiling point and that the only solution would 
be mediated negotiations” (Maunganidze, 2009b). The UN, AU and SADC had 
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begun to realise the seriousness of the situation and deployed various missions 
to assess the situation and attempt to support mediation efforts in the country.   
 
4.2.1 Responses to Increasing Instability in Early 2009 
 
As the political and security situation in Madagascar continued to deteriorate in 
the months of January and February, SADC deployed several missions including a 
preliminary mission led by the SADC Executive Secretary, Dr. Salomão, on 6 to 7 
February 2009 and a follow-up assessment mission comprising of the Organ 
Troika member states (the Kingdom of Swaziland, the Republic of Mozambique 
and Angola) from 14 to 19 February 2009 (SADC, 2009a). These missions were 
deployed to assess the situation in Madagascar following a briefing by the Prime 
Minister of Madagascar to the SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ Troika at 
the margins of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 2 February 2009 to 
discuss “the political and security situation in the country following recent 
developments which resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of property” 
(SADC, 2009b: 1). These consultations were held with the numerous 
stakeholders involved and included both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina (SADC, 
2009a; SADC, 2009c).   
In the SADC press release, SADC noted the need to encourage political 
dialogue among all the stakeholders in Madagascar; the need for political 
tolerance and respect for the rule of law; the need to resolve the current political 
challenges through peaceful means other than resorting to violence; and the 
need for respect for human rights (SADC, 2009b: 3). SADC further stated that it 
would be present in the mediation process through the SADC missions based in 
Antananarivo and that it would work with other international organisations 
including the AU and the UN in “facilitating for the peace of Madagascar”. SADC 
also stated that it would remain observant of the situation “until the challenges 
are overcome” and asked for the support of the international community in the 
local mediation efforts (SADC, 2009b: 3). On the position of SADC, it was further 
elaborated that the SADC Council of Ministers would “not entertain illegal 
removal of the legitimate Government from power” and would “provide 
assistance to Madagascar in terms of training of the security forces and antiriot 
equipment” (SADC, 2009c).  
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A DIRCO official explained in an interview that whilst SADC sent a number 
of missions during this time period, they spoke with the same people and had 
little to no follow-up after the completion of the missions (Interview with DIRCO 
Official, 2010b). In addition, a number of missions deployed by the AU and UN 
were taking place simultaneously. This time period in January and February is 
therefore described by several interviewees as a period with little coordination 
between the UN, AU and SADC (Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010a; Interview 
with Spies, 2010).   
 The AU issued several press releases and communiqués in the months of 
January and February expressing concern over the deteriorating situation, 
condemning the eruption of violence and reiterating the “unequivocal position of 
the African Union in condemning very strongly any unconstitutional changes of 
Government” (AU, 2009d; AU, 2009e). It also dispatched several representatives 
to assess the situation and to consult with the relevant stakeholders, including 
the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, and 
the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the Commission, Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo 
(AU, 2009d). 
The United Nations was also involved in these early stages, and at the 
invitation of the government of Madagascar (led by Ravalomanana), Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon dispatched Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 
Haile Menkerios, “to assess the situation in the country and explore what the 
United Nations could do to help further avert violence and contribute towards 
peace and stability in Madagascar” (UN, 2009). Chris Spies, who served on the 
Madagascar Support Unit for the UN from February to March 2009, explained in 
an interview that the UN during this time sought to support the local mediation 
efforts in Madagascar (Interview with Spies, 2010). He furthermore explained 
that he did not perceive the situation at the time as a well organised, 
coordinated, single-focused and collaborated effort amongst the international 
actors including the AU, UN and SADC (Interview with Spies, 2010). 
The initial responses by SADC, the AU and UN to the increasing political 
tensions in Madagascar therefore reflected a variety of missions and 
representatives from the respective organizations with the aim of gathering 
information on the situation and seeking to support local mediation efforts. 
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Additional actors also involved themselves in seeking to find a solution to the 
crisis, including the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the International 
Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF), the influential Madagascan Christian 
Council of Churches (FFKM) and individual countries such as Senegal and France 
(Maunganidze, 2009b). Furthermore, the UN had been given a prominent role in 
supporting the local mediation efforts since Ravalomanana and Rajoelina had 
“repeatedly agreed to talks on the basis that Haile Menkerios…would mediate” 
(Maunganidze, 2009b). In describing the manner in which the various 
organisations sought to address the crisis and support mediation, Chris Spies 
explains that it was a period that did not have a well organized, coordinated, 
single-focused collaborated effort on the part of the organisations involved 
(Interview with Spies, 2010). In describing the situation, Maunganidze (2009b) 
explains that: 
 
…the fact that there had been a myriad of mediators or potential mediators in the country 
was problematic because they lacked coordination, and none of them seemed to have 
deemed it necessary to take the lead in coordinating their efforts and harmonizing their 
proposals- something that is critical for any successful mediation. 
 
Whilst there are many factors which led to the failure of finding an early solution 
to the crisis, including the lack of willingness by Ravalomanana and Rajoelina to 
find a compromise, the lack of a coordinated and organised effort by the 
international community did not resolve the conflict at the time (Maunganidze, 
2009b; Zounmenou, 2009b: 72). Rajoelina was also mustering increased support 
by supporters opposing the Ravalomanana leadership. In addition, the 
Madagascan military became involved from January 2009 (API, 2009: 12). Whilst 
it was under pressure to remain neutral, the military was split between those 
who remained neutral to the conflict and those who supported the opposition 
(API, 2009: 12). In addition, wage-related grievances and allegations of 
corruption served to further involve the military in the conflict (API, 2009: 12). 
The situation therefore continued to deteriorate and ultimately resulted in a 
military-backed unconstitutional change of government in March 2009.   
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4.3 March 17: An Unconstitutional Change of Government 
  
The initial attempts by the international community to support mediation efforts 
in Madagascar are described as “too little, too late” (Interview with Spies, 2010). 
In reviewing the press releases and communiqués during this time period, SADC, 
the AU and the UN do point out the need to coordinate their efforts in 
Madagascar. However, their attempts did not succeed and the situation rapidly 
deteriorated. On 8 March 2009, mutineers in the military refused to follow 
orders from the Defence Minister to use force against protesters and forced the 
minister to resign (API, 2009: 12). Rajoelina capitalised upon this opportunity 
and with the support of pro-Rajoelina soldiers had the army chief removed 
marking the demise of Ravalomanana’s control over the army (API, 2009: 13). On 
17 March, Ravalomanana announced his resignation and handed power over to 
the military directorate (Maunganidze, 2009:1; API, 2009: 13). This transfer of 
power was however unconstitutional in itself, as the Constitution requires that 
the transfer of power goes to the President of the Senate (API, 2009: 13; 
Constitution of Madagascar, 1992). The military then declared Rajoelina 
President of Madagascar followed by the High Constitutional Court confirming 
this decision (API, 2009: 13; Maunganidze, 2009a: 1). Andry Rajoelina was 
therefore inaugurated as President of Madagascar on March 21, 2009, and as 
head of the High Transitional Authority (Maunganidze, 2009a: 1).  
 In assessing whether or not this was a case of unconstitutional change of 
government, the first point to note is that Rajoelina did not come into power 
through an electoral process (Maunganidze, 2009b; Constitution of Madagascar, 
1992). The August 1992 Constitution of Madagascar states under Article 45 that 
“the ‘President of the Republic shall be elected by universal direct suffrage’” 
(Maunganidze, 2009b). Furthermore, in the event of a President’s resignation 
Article 52 stipulates that the President of the Senate is to take over power and 
organise elections within a two month period (Constitution of Madagascar, 1992; 
API, 2009: 7).   Lastly, Article 46 of the Constitution requires that candidates for 
President must be at least forty years old at the time that candidacy is declared 
(Constitution of Madagascar, 1992; Maunganidze, 2009b). Rajoelina was only 
thirty-four years old at the time, thereby rendering him six years too young to be 
a candidate for president (Maunganidze, 2009b; BBC, 2009b). These factors 
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therefore clearly depict the change of government in Madagascar on 17 March 
2009 and the consequent inauguration of Rajoelina as President and Head of the 
High Transitional Authority as unconstitutional.   
 
4.3.1 A Hard-Line Stance by the SADC  
 
Following the transfer of power to the military, SADC held an Extraordinary 
Summit of the Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation on 19 
March 2009 to discuss the political and security situation in Madagascar. In the 
Summit communiqué, SADC explicitly stated that “the Organ condemns in the 
strongest terms the unconstitutional actions that have led to the illegal ousting of 
the democratically-elected President of a SADC Member State” (SADC, 2009a). 
SADC further stated that it cannot and does not recognize Rajoelina as President 
of Madagascar “because this appointment not only violates the Constitution of 
Madagascar and democratic principles, but violates the core principles and 
Treaty of SADC, the African Union and the United Nations Charters” (SADC, 
2009a). It also mandated the Executive Secretary to engage with the AU and UN 
“to help define a comprehensive and coherent strategy” and called for the AU and 
UN not to recognize the appointment of Rajoelina and to support the return to 
democratic and constitutional rule in the country (SADC, 2009a).  
 This position and statement by SADC depicts a clear and strong stance 
against an unconstitutional change of government in the region. Following this 
meeting, SADC reconvened on 30 March for another Extraordinary Summit and 
decided to suspend Madagascar “from all the Community’s institutions and 
organs until the return of the Country to constitutional normalcy with immediate 
effect” (SADC, 2009d). SADC also urged Rajoelina to vacate the office of the 
President for the unconditional reinstatement of President Ravalomanana and 
also stated that it will consider other options to restore constitutional normalcy 
if Rajoelina does not comply (SADC, 2009d).  
 The initial response by SADC was regarded by several involved in the 
process as a very hard-line stance in which SADC called for the unconditional and 
immediate reinstatement of Ravalomanana and hinted towards the possibility of 
a SADC military intervention (Interview with UN Official, 2010a; Interview with 
Spies, 2010; API, 2009: 15; Maunganidze, 2009: 5). A SADC official confirms that 
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SADC did consider military intervention as one of several options to address the 
crisis although a diplomatic solution was considered the first option (Interview 
with Ndlovu, 2010). This would not have been the first time SADC chose to use 
military force, as it had done in Lesotho and in the DRC in 1998, although these 
interventions were promoted by a small group of states and were not necessarily 
representative of an all inclusive decision by SADC member states to intervene 
(Nathan, 2006: 612). In addition, the use of force to address an unconstitutional 
change of government had taken place in the Comoros in 2008 when the AU 
dispatched one thousand Tanzanian and Sudanese soldiers to remove the self-
declared president (API, 2009: 16). The use of military force had therefore been 
considered an option in other cases of unconstitutional changes of government, 
although the threat by SADC to use force in the case of Madagascar served to 
distance SADC from the AU and UN who sought to address the issue though 
diplomatic channels. In addition, the call for an unconditional and immediate 
reinstatement of Ravalomanana also left SADC with less room for negotiating a 
solution with both parties. The initial SADC response was therefore regarded as 
being “ineffective and its radical approach undermined any attempt at a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis” (Zounmenou, 2009b: 73). A DIRCO official reiterates that 
SADC marginalized itself completely in the first phase because of its hard line 
stance (Interview with DIRCO official, 2010b).  
 
4.3.2 The AU and UN Seek Diplomatic Solutions 
 
The AU PSC met on 20 March 2009, where it strongly condemned the 
unconstitutional change of government and stated that this “marks another 
serious setback in the ongoing democratization processes on the continent and 
reinforces the concern over the resurgence of the scourge of coups d’état in 
Africa…” (AU, 2009f). The AU therefore decided to suspend Madagascar from 
participating in the activities of the AU until the restoration of constitutional 
order. The AU also stated that it would take all measures necessary as outlined in 
the Algiers Decision of 1999, the Lomé Declaration of 2000, the Constitutive Act 
of the AU and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council, including the imposition of sanctions, and called upon all 
members of the AU and the international community to reject the 
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unconstitutional change and to work closely with their partners including SADC 
and the UN to restore constitutional order in the country (AU, 2009f).  
 In response to the resignation of Ravalomanana on 17 March, the UN 
Secretary-General issued a statement expressing “grave concern” over the 
developments in Madagascar and calling on all parties concerned “to act 
responsibly and ensure stability and a smooth transition through democratic 
means” (UN, 2009b). A UN official explains that the General Assembly and the 
Security Council did not issue a resolution explicitly condemning the 
unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, leaving the Secretary-
General to present the position of the UN on Madagascar (Interview with UN 
official, 2010c; Interview with UN Official, 2010a). The UN response therefore 
expressed “grave concern” and did not explicitly condemn the unconstitutional 
change of government in Madagascar. Whilst not explicitly condemning it, the UN 
did recognize that this was a case of unconstitutional change of government. 
Following a briefing on the situation in Madagascar to the Security Council on 7 
April 2009, Haile Menkerios told the press that “Council members expressed 
serious concern about the unconstitutional transfer of power and called for a 
quick return to constitutional order” (UNSC, 2009b). 
 
4.4 Initial Attempts Toward a Return to Constitutional Order 
 
Following these initial responses to the transfer of power in Madagascar, a series 
of mediation talks pursued through the months of April to June. In recognizing 
the need to better coordinate efforts in seeking a conciliatory solution to the 
crisis, the AU decided in early April to establish an International Contact Group 
(ICG) for Madagascar under the aegis of the AU to better coordinate the efforts of 
the international community and ensure that the international community “took 
a common position in pushing for a return to constitutional order in Madagascar” 
(Malone, 2009). Several interviewees explain that this initiative by the AU to 
establish an ICG for Madagascar depicted the AU resolve to lead the mediation 
talks and take the lead in addressing the situation in Madagascar (Interview with 
UN official, 2010d; Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010a). At the time of the first 
meeting of the ICG, the Special Envoys of the AU and UN, Mr. Ablassé Ouedraogo 
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and Mr. Tiébilé Dramé respectively, “informed the participants of the 
developments of the situation and the initiatives taken by the international 
community on the ground” (All Africa, 2009). The AU and UN Special Envoys for 
Madagascar were at this point the leading mediators for the negotiation talks, 
and it was only after the first meeting of the ICG that SADC appointed a Special 
Envoy for Madagascar (All Africa, 2009; Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010b). 
Mr. Absalom Themba Dlamini, former Prime Minister of Swaziland, was 
consequently appointed as the SADC Special Envoy following the first meeting of 
the ICG. 
 The ICG also set objectives on how to move forward on Madagascar. These 
included  
 
a clear calendar towards holding free, fair and transparent elections involving all 
stakeholders under a neutral electoral body including representatives of all political 
camps; the involvement of all the political and social stakeholders in the country, 
including President Marc Ravalomanana as well as other national personalities, in search 
for a solution; promotion of consensus among the Malagasy parties; respect for the 
Constitution of Madagascar; compliance with relevant AU instruments and the 
international commitments of Madagascar. (All Africa, 2009) 
 
4.4.1 Contradicting AU Principles? 
 
The round of negotiations held between April and June 2009 took place in the 
context of continuing political tensions, violence and arrests in Madagascar. 
Furthermore, these negotiation talks also introduced the former heads of state of 
Madagascar, Mr. Didier Ratsiraka and Mr. Albert Zafy, to the negotiating table as 
outlined in the objectives of the first meeting of the ICG allowing for the 
involvement of all political camps (Interview with DIRCO official, 2010b; Mail 
and Guardian, 2009a). Negotiations for finding a consensual solution to the crisis 
therefore led to the involvement of four political movements. Furthermore, an 
accord was proposed following lengthy negotiations for establishing a “neutral, 
peaceful and consensual transition” (Mail and Guardian, 2009a). This accord 
allowed for the participation of the former heads of state and the head of the 
transition in the next presidential elections. These decisions made during this 
first round of negotiations following the transfer of power in Madagascar 
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therefore allowed Rajoelina, who led the unconstitutional change of government 
which received international condemnation, to run for presidential elections. 
With reference to the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 
2007, paragraph four of Article 25 states that “[t]he perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in 
elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of 
responsibility in political institutions of their State” (AU, 2007). The decision to 
allow Rajoelina to take part in presidential elections was therefore in violation of 
Article 25 of the Charter. Although the Charter was not yet ratified at the time, 
this decision was in direct contrast to the principles of the AU on how to address 
unconstitutional changes of government.  
 Negotiation attempts at forming an inclusive interim government to lead 
Madagascar into presidential elections however collapsed on 16 June 2009. The 
failure of these negotiations came “after the four participating political 
movements failed to agree on a political amnesty clause that would have paved 
the way for ousted leader Marc Ravalomanana to return” (Lough, 2009). The AU 
Special Envoy stated that these talks failed largely due to the lack of political will 
to find a consensual solution, and both AU and UN officials warned the Rajoelina 
government and opposition against “[a]ny attempt to find a unilateral way out of 
the crisis by one or other of the movements…” (Lough, 2009). The AU and UN led 
talks were therefore suspended on an indeterminate basis, and the Special 
Envoys soon left Madagascar.  
 In the initial response to the case of Madagascar, we find that both the AU 
and SADC explicitly condemned the unconstitutional change of government and 
suspended Madagascar from taking part in the activities of the respective 
organisations. Whilst SADC chose a hard-line stance, serving to weaken its 
position in the negotiations and separate itself from the position of the AU and 
UN, the AU established an ICG and took an initial lead in the negotiations. The UN 
expressed “grave concern”, but did not explicitly condemn the unconstitutional 
transfer of power. Furthermore, we find that the UN chose to support the 
decisions taken by the AU and provided support for mediation efforts led by the 
regional body.  In the initial response then, we find that the AU took a leading 
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role with clear reference to the AU normative framework on unconstitutional 
changes of government, with support from the UN and SADC.  
 
4.4.2 SADC Seeks to Take the Lead 
 
Whilst SADC’s involvement in the mediation process between April and June was 
not regarded as completely aligned with the negotiating team led by the AU and 
UN, SADC made a shift in its approach in June with the SADC Extraordinary 
Summit (Interview with UN Official, 2010d). The Extraordinary Summit of SADC 
Heads of State and Government was held on 20 June 2009 to address the political 
and security situation in Madagascar (SADC, 2009e). SADC noted with 
appreciation the progress made in all-party negotiations facilitated by the AU, UN 
and the International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF). SADC further 
decided to proactively promote and facilitate dialogue and therefore appointed 
Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, “to lead and coordinate the 
all-party dialogue in Madagascar” (SADC, 2009e). SADC also stated its decision to 
work closely with the AU, UN and IOF and that it would continue to coordinate its 
mediation efforts in Madagascar with the AU and UN.   
 This summit therefore marks a particular shift in the SADC approach, in 
which SADC explicitly states its objective to lead the negotiations through the 
appointed SADC mediator, Mr. Chissano. SADC also erased any fears of a SADC 
military intervention into Madagascar, and retracted from its earlier call for an 
unconditional reinstatement of Ravalomanana to express a willingness to 
promote mediation with all parties concerned (Interview with UN Official, 
2010d; Maunganidze, 2009: 5). This decision also sought to place SADC in the 
leading role in the mediation process, with Chissano as the lead mediator. A 
SADC official explained that to better coordinate the efforts of the international 
community there was a need to accept the proposal by the organisation closest 
to the conflict (Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). SADC’s leading role in promoting 
and maintain peace and stability in the southern African region is supported in 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which states that regional arrangements should 
make an effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes before referring 
them to the Security Council, as well as in the AU mandate to coordinate the 
activities of the REC’s with the objectives of the AU peace and security 
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architecture, as outlined in Article 3(l) of the Constitutive Act as well as in the 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
AU (Interview with Ndlovu, 2010; AU, 2000; AU, 2002). This summit introduced 
the intentions of SADC to take the lead in the mediation process and seek to 
coordinate its efforts with the AU and UN. A main reason for this decision was 
the expressed interest and resolve by SADC as the regional economic community 
in southern Africa to find a solution at the sub-regional level (Interview with UN 
Official, 2010a; Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). Whilst this shift in leading the 
negotiations was perceived by some as a potential area for misunderstanding 
between the AU and SADC and a threat to the negotiation process, the UN and AU 
supported the decision, placing Mr. Chissano as the SADC mediator at the head of 
the negotiating process.  
 
4.4.3 Paving the Way for the Maputo Summits  
 
With the appointment of Chissano by SADC, Chissano became the chief mediator 
whilst the AU continued to play a leading role in the ICG (Maunganidze, 2009: 5). 
It was also at the second meeting of the ICG on 22 July 2009 that it was agreed to 
convene a meeting including all four political camps represented by their 
respective chefs de file “to reach a consensual solution for the rapid return to 
constitutional order and to resolve the outstanding issues following the 
suspension of inter-Malagasy negotiations on 16 June 2009” (AU, 2009g). The 
ICG decided that the meeting was to take place under the leadership of former 
President Chissano, “assisted by the SADC Mediation Team and Special Envoys of 
the AU, the UN and OIF” (AU, 2009g). The ICG also encouraged the AU PSC to 
remain seized of the matter and “to take the measures provided for to this end if, 
at the expiration of six-month period stipulated by the [Lomé] Declaration, there 
is no significant progress towards the return to constitutional order” (AU, 
2009g). This meeting marked the decision by the AU, UN and SADC to give the 
parties to the conflict six months to return the country to constitutional order 
before measures would be taken including the use of sanctions.  
 A Joint Mediation Team for Madagascar (JMT-M) had also been put in 
place, consisting of the Special Envoys of the AU, SADC, UN and the OIF under the 
aegis of the AU (AU, 2009g; Interview with Sangiza, 2010). The mediation team 
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served to provide a collaborative mediation effort by the main mediators of the 
organisations involved, as a step toward collecting the UN, AU, SADC and OIF so 
they could better work together under the leadership of Chissano. A UN official 
explains that this mediation team had in practice sought cooperation since 
January 2009 following the first attempted rounds of negotiations, but that it 
came better into place with the appointment of Chissano as the lead mediator 
and particularly following the second meeting of the ICG (Interview with UN 
Official, 2010d). The Joint Mediation Team therefore led the Maputo meetings, 
with Chissano as the lead mediator, and in close consultation with the larger 
grouping of the ICG on Madagascar (JMT-M, 2009; AU, 2009h).  
 
4.5 Maputo I and II: No Solution Found 
 
A series of agreements were concluded during the Maputo Summit from 5 to 8 
August 2009, including a Transitional Charter and the decision that the power-
sharing government would nominate a president, vice-president, prime minister, 
three deputy prime ministers, twenty-eight cabinet ministers and a legislature 
within thirty days of the signing of the agreement 9 August (JMT-M, 2009; API, 
2009: 17; Lough, 2009). They also agreed to hold internationally supervised 
presidential and general elections within fifteen months of signing the 
agreement, and on amnesty issues (API, 2009: 17). However, no agreement was 
reached during the Summit on the distribution of key posts, including that of 
president and prime-minister, and also who would head the transition (API, 
2009: 18; Mail and Guardian, 2009b). This led Rajoelina to declare himself the 
head of the transition on 14 August 2009 which Ravalomanana quickly rejected 
(Mail and Guardian, 2009b). A second round of talks, dubbed the Maputo II 
Summit, were therefore held in Maputo from 25 to 26 August with a focus upon 
the “consensual distribution of posts within the Transitional Institutions and 
Organs between all political and social forces of the country” (AU, 2009h). These 
talks did not however result in any further consensus particularly on the issue of 
assigning the posts of President, Prime Minister and Vice-President within the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and ultimately led to a stalemate 
(Maunganidze, 2009: 6). On 8 September Rajoelina claimed the leadership of the 
transition, appointed his own Prime Minister to head the inclusive transition 
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government and also appointed a 31-minister “unity government” without 
including or consulting with the other political parties involved in the Maputo 
agreements (API, 2009: 18;  Zounmenou, 2009b: 74; Mail and Guardian, 2009c).  
As a response, the JMT-M “rejected ‘any unilateral solution’” and called on 
new talks between the parties (Mail and Guardian, 2009c). At the SADC Summit 
of Heads of State and Government from 7 to 8 September 2009, SADC also “firmly 
rejected and condemned any unilateral decision which violates the spirit of the 
Maputo agreements” and reiterated the suspension of Madagascar until the 
restoration of constitutional order (SADC, 2009f). The AU PSC also issued a 
statement expressing condemnation of the unilateral move by Rajoelina and 
calling for resumed dialogue with the political movements for an “inclusive and 
peaceful implementation of the Charter and the Transition Agreements signed in 
Maputo…” (AU, 2009i). Throughout the two meetings held in Maputo in August, 
UN officials explain that the UN provided support for the mediation efforts 
particularly in drafting political agreements and mediation documents, providing 
advice and support for the mediation talks and generally supporting the efforts 
of the regional and sub-regional organisations in their mediation attempts 
(Interview with UN Official, 2010b; Interview with UN Official, 2010d). There 
was also a senior UN political advisor, Mr. Dramé, who was part of the mediation 
team (through the JMT-M) and provided support for the mediation talks 
(Interview with UN Official, 2010d; UN News Centre, 2009c). Following the 
meetings in Maputo, the UNSG also issued a statement welcoming the progress 
towards forming a Government of National Unity (GNU), stating that the UN will 
remain engaged in the mediation process through the JMT-M led by Chissano, 
and expressing its commitment to support the full implementation of the Maputo 
agreements for a rapid return to constitutional order through credible elections 
(UN, 2009c). The UN therefore sought to support the mediation efforts, 
particularly through the JMT-M. 
 The talks in Maputo included the four Malagasy political movements, 
including Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka and Zafy (AU, 2009h; API, 2009: 
17). This had initially been agreed upon in the earlier negotiation rounds held 
between April and June, and followed over to the Maputo meetings (Interview 
with DIRCO Official, 2010a; Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010b). In asking why 
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the negotiation talks involved four political movements, and not just the 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina movements, a UN Official explains that the 
involvement of all four provided political leverage and support in the country 
(Interview with Ranaivomanana, 2010). These four movements were regarded 
as representing the bulk of political power in Madagascar, and could therefore be 
beneficial for finding a consensual solution reflecting a majority solution in the 
country (Interview with Ranaivomanana, 2010). However, the involvement of all 
four movements also resulted in more issues being raised in the negotiation 
process, which could slow the process in finding a transitional government 
(Interview with Ranaivomanana, 2010).  
 
4.5.1 SADC Blocks Rajoelina’s Address to the UN 
 
Amidst the international condemnation of the unconstitutional change of 
government in Madagascar, the UN invited Rajoelina to address the 64th session 
of the General Assembly in September 2009 (Lough, 2009d; API, 2009: 16). The 
invitation provoked speculation that “the United Nations is softening its stance 
on Africa’s youngest leader” (Lough, 2009d). In response, the foreign minister of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo intervened on behalf of SADC and stated that 
“SADC would like to express its protest against the decision to invite Mr. Andry 
Rajoelina to take the floor at the general debate…” (VOA News, 2009). He pointed 
to the AU and SADC decision to not recognize Rajoelina as president and that a 
return to constitutional order had not yet taken place (VOA News, 2009: API, 
2009: 16). As a result, and following some confusion at the session, a vote was 
held and the motion was carried to bar Rajoelina from addressing the General 
Assembly (Daily Nation, 2009; API, 2009: 16). A UN official explains that the 
invitation by the UN received strong responses from the AU and SADC, 
expressing their concern that the invitation served to undermine the negotiation 
process underway (Interview with UN Official, 2010c). In addition, the strong 
stance taken by SADC and the consequent approval of the motion to bar 
Rajoelina from speaking at the session also showed a strong resolve and an 
important achievement by SADC in seeking UN support to not recognize the 
government of Rajoelina. 
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4.6 Continued Attempts Toward Constitutional Order  
 
Several rounds of negotiations were held in the months between September and 
December, 2009. The ICG-M held a third meeting on 6 October 2009, in which 
there was also a follow-up accord between the Malagasy political parties seeking 
to formalise the transition government and “agreed in principle on the 
composition of the interim government to lead Madagascar to fresh elections…” 
(API, 2009:19; AU, 2009j). In this accord, Ravalomanana agreed to give the 
position as interim President to Rajoelina on the condition that Rajoelina not be a 
candidate for the next presidential elections (Pourtier, 2009; Lough, 2009b). 
However, the AU Special Envoy, Mr. Ouedraogo, emphasized that the Maputo 
Agreement of 9 August “provided for the transition president, whatever his 
identity, to run in the presidential election” (Pourtier, 2009). It was also further 
decided that a third meeting with the chefs de file be held, and it was initially 
said that this meeting was to be held in Geneva or Paris (Pourtier, 2009). A SADC 
official explains however that both SADC and the AU argued for the need to keep 
the meetings in Africa as this was an African issue which should be addressed in 
Africa (Interview with Sangiza, 2010). Following discussions, it was finally 
decided that the meeting be held in Addis Ababa (Interview with Sangiza, 2010).   
 A third meeting of the chefs de file of the political movements of 
Madagascar was therefore held from 3 to 7 November 2009 in Addis Ababa 
under the auspices of the ICG-M, which saw the signing of the Additional Act of 
Addis Ababa to the Charter of the Transition which was part of the Charter of 
Transition signed in Maputo on 9 August (AU, 2009j). The UNSG issued a 
statement following this meeting pledging continued UN support “throughout 
the transition and beyond” and stated that the UN will continue to support and 
work closely with the JMT-M led by Chissano (UN, 2009d). This agreement 
assigned Rajoelina the presidency accompanied by a Presidential Council which 
consisted of two new co-presidents, namely Ravalomanana and former president 
Zafy (Lough, 2009c). The agreement however was not entirely clear in how the 
executive power would be divided between the president and the co-presidents 
of the Presidential Council, and the distribution of cabinet posts and the final 
formation of an interim government continued to be postponed (ICG, 2010). 
There was also an attempt at bringing together the four chefs de file at what is 
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referred to as the Maputo III meeting in early December 2009, although 
Rajoelina refused to attend. When the other three movements did attend talks, 
Rajoelina announced that he could not guarantee the safety of the three former 
leaders in Madagascar and stalled any further negotiations at the time (ICG, 
2010; Interview with DIRCO Official, 2010a).  
By late December 2009, Rajoelina issued a presidential decree dismissing 
the consensus Prime Minister, naming a loyal army colonel in his place, and 
alleging the implementation of the Maputo Agreements and the Addis Additional 
Act as intenable (SABC News, 2009; All Africa, 2010; ICG, 2010).    
This time period depicts a series of efforts at the sub-regional and 
regional levels to push for a solution to the crises, with meetings being held both 
in southern Africa and in Addis Ababa. Following the appointment of Mr. 
Chissano, negotiations were led by the SADC mediator in close cooperation with 
the AU and UN particularly through the JMT-M and also through the ICG-M 
(Interview with UN Official, 2010d). The JMT-M did manage to have agreements 
signed at the 8 to 9 August Maputo Summit as well as the Addis Additional Act. 
However, the lack of political will amongst the parties involved stalled any 
progress in forming a transitional government and planning elections (Interview 
with UN Official, 2010b; All Africa, 2010).  
 
4.6.1 A Source for Contestation between SADC and the AU 
 
In seeking to further implement the Maputo agreements and the agreements of 
the Addis Additional Act, Article 12 of the Addis Additional Act called for the 
establishment of a Follow-Up Mechanism to “contribute to efforts aiming at 
resolving difficulties that may arise in the functioning of the transitional 
institutions, as well as, to the achievement of sustainable progress to meet the 
conditions for the successful holding of legislative and presidential elections…” 
(AU, 2009k; All Africa, 2010). In a report submitted by the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission on Madagascar, Mr. Jean Ping explains that he wrote to the UN, OIF 
and SADC “to indicate that, following the successful conclusion of the mission 
entrusted to the Joint Mediation, the support of the international community to 
the crisis exit process would henceforth be carried out through the Monitoring 
Mechanism” (AU, 2010c). An AU official explains that the call for the 
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establishment of a Follow-Up Mechanism reflected the opinion of the AU and of 
the Chairperson of the AU Commission that there was a need to end the 
mediation efforts of the JMT-M and to move forward with implementing the 
Maputo agreements and the Addis Additional Act (Interview with UN Official, 
2010a; Interview with AU Official, 2010). A UN official supports this perception 
that the AU now sought to take the lead forward in ending further negotiations 
and establishing a Follow-Up Mechanism (Interview with UN Official, 2010d). 
Another AU official further elaborates that the call by the AU for ending the 
mediation talks and establishing a Follow-Up Mechanism to implement the 
agreements served as a source for contention between the AU and SADC, in how 
to move forward in resolving the political impasse in Madagascar (Interview 
with AU Official, 2010b).  
At the fourth meeting of the ICG-M, the ICG-M “urged the Malagasy parties 
to conclude expeditiously the full agreement on a transitional arrangement, 
building on what they had already agreed to in the Maputo Agreements of 8 and 
9 August 2009 and the Addis Additional Act of 6 November 2009, duly 
negotiated and signed by the four Leaders of the political camps in Madagascar” 
(All Africa, 2010). The ICG-M further expressed its support to the initiative 
envisaged by the Chairperson of the Commission to “present to the Malagasy 
parties a compromise solution on the outstanding issues to resolve the current 
stalemate”, and encouraged the AU Commission to intensify efforts to finalise the 
rapid establishment of the Follow-Up Mechanism (All Africa, 2010). The ICG-M 
further states that the Mechanism is to “facilitate the implementation of 
commitments made, the monitoring of the situation on the ground and the 
coordination of the efforts to support the process for a way out of the crisis in 
Madagascar” (All Africa, 2010). Following this meeting, the Chairperson of the 
Commission visited Antananarivo on 20 and 21 January 2010 and presented 
crisis exit-proposals to the Malagasy parties (AU, 2010d). During this time, SADC 
held its Double Troika Summit on 14 January 2010 in which it reiterated and 
maintained the suspension of Madagascar from all SADC organs, called for the 
AU, UN and international community to apply the same measure, called for the 
speedy implementation of the Maputo agreements and the Additional Act of 
Addis, and finally requested the SADC Mediator to “continue with efforts towards 
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restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar, through an inclusive, 
transparent and credible dialogue” (SADC, 2010a).  
Under the 14th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, the situation in 
Madagascar was addressed and the Chairperson of the Commission presented a 
report on the situation (SADC, 2010b). In response, Mr. Pohamba, President of 
Namibia and Deputy Chairperson SADC, issued a statement to the 14th Ordinary 
Session of the AU Assembly to brief and update the Assembly on the situation in 
Madagascar and addressed the decisions of the 4th meeting of the ICG-M. Here he 
states that “it must be noted Mr. Chairperson, that during the ICG-M there was a 
consensus, with the exception of one European country, to maintain the Mediator 
and even to strengthen his negotiation capabilities” (SADC, 2010b). He continues 
by underlining that “the ICG-M is not an institution of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture, but a consultative forum” and further states that “[i]t is 
imperative that the AU Commission and the SADC Secretariat work closely and 
render the necessary support to the Mediator…” (SADC, 2010b). In concluding 
his statement, Mr. Pohamba states that the “Chairperson of the AU Commission 
should be supported and encouraged to increase his interaction with all the 
RECs. In fact, the Chairperson of the Commission should not only promote annual 
meetings but also pay regular visits to the Regional Economic Communities. This 
activity should be included in his periodical reports” (SADC, 2010b).  
 The decisions of the 4th ICG-M depicted a source for contention between 
the AU and SADC on how to move forward, particularly with regards to the role 
of the ICG-M as a consultative forum versus a mediating body. This perception of 
contention is supported by discussions with AU and UN officials and also 
particularly depicted through the statement presented to the AU Assembly by the 
Deputy Chairperson of SADC. At the 14th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, a 
Decision on Madagascar was issued in which the AU “underscores the leading 
role played by SADC in the mediation process, given its regional responsibilities 
and comparative advantages” (AU, 2010e). It further stressed the need for 
establishing the Follow-Up Mechanism however, and requested the Peace and 
Security Council to meet in due course following the proposals presented by the 
AU Chairperson of Commission to the Malagasy parties to review the situation 
and take the required decisions in light of the relevant AU Instruments (AU, 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
 
2010e). In addition, the AU “Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacity of the African Union to 
Manage such Situations” at the 14th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly also 
called on “all non-African international bodies, including the United Nations and 
its General Assembly, to refrain from granting accreditation to such authorities, 
thus strengthening the automatic suspension measures of the AU against those 
countries…” (AU, 2010f). A UN official explains that this call by the AU was noted 
by the UN, particularly in the context of the recent invitation to Rajoelina to 
address the UN General Assembly session in September 2009 (Interview with UN 
Official, 2010a).  
The Chairperson of the AU Commission, with support from an expert 
group of the ICG-M, submitted a proposed compromise solution to the Malagasy 
parties on 21 and 22 January 2010 to re-launch the implementation process of 
the Maputo agreements of 8 and 9 August and the Addis Ababa Additional Act of 
6 November 2009 (ICG-M, 2010). This proposal included a call for a 
constitutional referendum to approve the Constitution in accordance with the 
Charter of the Transition, and to organise both legislative and presidential 
elections no later than October 2010 (AU, 2010g). Whilst the Ratsiraka, 
Ravalomanana and Zafy camps expressed their general agreement with the 
proposals, the ICG-M noted that the Rajoelina camp was “not fully consistent 
with the proposals for compromise solutions” (ICG-M, 2010). As a result, the ICG-
M stated that should the impasse persist, the organisations and countries of the 
ICG-M would take necessary steps including the imposition of sanctions “against 
all those who impede the process of restoring constitutional order” (ICG-M, 
2010). Following this meeting, the AU PSC met 19 February 2010 and decided 
that if by 16 March 2010, the de facto authorities borne out of the 
unconstitutional change did not comply with the full and timely implementation 
of the Maputo Agreements and the Addis Ababa Additional Act, sanctions would 
be imposed (AU, 2010h). With particular reference to the Lomé Declaration, the 
AU Assembly Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government at the 14th 
Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, and the Ezulwini Framework, sanctions to 
be applied included: 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
travel bans against all members of the institutions set up by the de facto authorities 
borne out of the unconstitutional change and all other individual members of the 
Rajoelina camp whose actions impede the AU and SADC efforts to restore constitutional 
order…the freezing of funds, other financial assets and economic resources of individuals 
and entities contributing, in one way or another, to the maintenance of the 
unconstitutional status quo…[and] the diplomatic isolation of the de facto authorities 
borne out of the unconstitutional change…. (AU, 2010h)  
 
The PSC decided that the AU in close collaboration with SADC was to establish a 
list of the individuals and entities which would have sanctions imposed upon 
them, and called on the international community including the UN to “fully and 
unreservedly support the present decision” (AU, 2010h).  
 
4.7 The Imposition of Sanctions by the AU and SADC 
 
On the one year anniversary of the unconstitutional change of government in 
Madagascar, the AU PSC reconvened on 17 March 2010 and noted with regret 
that the authorities in place and the Rajoelina Camp had not, within the 
stipulated time, responded positively to the AU PSC request to accept the Maputo 
Agreements and the Addis Additional Act (AU, 2010i). It was also noted that 
Rajoelina continued to act unilaterally in violation of the agreements in place. 
The AU PSC, in close collaboration with SADC representatives, therefore decided 
to impose the sanctions of travel bans, freezing of funds and other financial 
assets and economic resources, as well as diplomatic isolation against Rajoelina 
and one hundred and eight other individuals including top military officers (AU, 
2010i). The AU also called on the international community, including the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, to support the decision of 
imposing sanctions. Whilst sanctions were to be imposed as of 17 March 2010, it 
was decided that the AU, through the Chairperson of the Commission, and the 
head of the SADC mediation team, would continue their efforts whilst sanctions 
were being imposed to re-launch the process of implementing the Maputo 
agreements and the Addis Additional Act. The AU and SADC were therefore 
supportive of the implementation of sanctions. However, several UN and AU 
officials explain in interviews that some members of the UN Security Council 
were not supportive of imposing sanctions (Interview with Ranaivomanana, 
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2010; Interview with Matlosa, 2010; Interview with Anonymous source, 2010; 
Interview with Nkeshimana, 2010; Interview with AU Official, 2010b). Some 
members of the UN therefore contradicted the attempt by the AU and SADC to 
take a strong and firm stance against the de facto authorities of the 
unconstitutional change of government and challenged the attempt to collect 
firm support from the international community in imposing sanctions 
particularly with regards to diplomatic sanctions.  
 
4.8 The Roadmap for Ending the Crisis  
 
Following the imposition of sanctions by the AU and SADC, another attempt at 
negotiating a solution to the crisis was held in Pretoria from 28 to 30 April 2010 
(SADC, 2010c). This meeting included the four political movements and was led 
by the SADC mediator, Mr. Chissano, with the support and facilitation of the 
President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma (SADC, 2010c). The 
Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mr. Ping, the SADC Executive Secretary, Mr. 
Salomão, and a UN representative were also present at the talks (SADC, 2010c). 
France was also represented, and the inclusion of South Africa and France is said 
to have been an attempt to add political and economic leverage to urge the 
political movements to find a solution (Interview with UN Official, 2010b; 
Interview with Ndlovu, 2010). However, these talks did not manage to address 
all of the outstanding issues, particularly with regards to the timing of elections 
and amnesty issues, and it was decided to reconvene fifteen days after the 
meetings (SADC, 2010c; Iloniaina, 2010). Following this meeting, Rajoelina 
declared that the time for negotiations was over and that he would move 
forward with forming a new government (Iloniaina, 2010). Rajoelina 
consequently announced on 12 May 2010 that he would not run for president in 
the next elections, yet a consensual solution to the crisis involving all four 
political movements was not yet in place (Clottey, 2010; ICG, 2010). Following 
these events, international mediation efforts sputtered and Rajoelina and his 
government continued unilateral efforts to legitimize their rule for the 
remainder of 2010 (Ploch and Cook, 2012: 13).  
 By early 2011, SADC resumed mediation efforts and in September 2011 
the “Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar” was signed by ten of eleven 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
major Malagasy political movements and nine additional smaller ones (Ploch and 
Cook, 2012: 1). The Roadmap was supplemented by the “Framework for the 
Implementation of the Roadmap” in October, providing a timeline for 
implementing the roadmap. In additional, a consensual Prime Minister was 
appointed, a Government of National Unity formed, and the High Council of the 
Transition and the Transition Congress were established (AU, 2011a). Whilst the 
Zafy mouvance was a signatory to the roadmap and the Ratsiraka mouvance was 
not, both chose not to join the Transition thereby withdrawing from the 
implementation process of the Roadmap (AU, 2011b).  In March 2012, an 
independent transitional electoral commission was appointed followed by an 
Amnesty Law passed in mid-April to address some of the major stumbling blocs 
for a negotiated settlement between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana. Lastly, a 
provisional electoral timetable was adopted in May 2012 with a projected 
completion set to November 2012 (Ploch and Cook, 2012: 3). At an 
Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government on 1 June 
2012, SADC noted with satisfaction the progress made to return the country to 
constitutional normalcy and implement the Roadmap for holding credible, free 
and fair elections (SADC, 2012). Although an amnesty law was passed in April 
2012, some important issues remained unsolved particularly regarding amnesty 
for Ravalomanana as well as the return to the country “unconditionally” of 
Malagasy citizens in exile for political reasons (Ploch and Cook, 2012: 4).  
 In November 2011 a SADC Liaison Office was established to support the 
implementation of the Roadmap and has been fully operational since January 
2012 (SADC, 2012). In addition, the AU PSC requested that the AUC and SADC 
Secretariat establish a join Liaison Office in Antananarivo. In a report on the 
current political developments in Madagascar, the ISS notes that whilst the AU 
and SADC have maintained a firm stance and continued sanctions against the 
country, the UN position has “increasingly softened” (ISS, 2012). In May 2011, 
Rajoelina was invited as Head of State to participate in the 4th UN Conference on 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Rajoelina was also allowed to address the 66th 
Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2011, and in February 2012 
the UN granted a $150 million to Madagascar for a one-year (2012-2013) 
development programme (ISS, 2012).  
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As of June 2012, elections have yet to take place and the political 
environment continues to be described as volatile and uncertain. SADC continues 
to lead efforts toward the implementation of the Roadmap, with support from 
the AU. Whilst the UN continues to take part in the ICG-M, it seems to have 
weakened its position and any principled stance on condemning the 
unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar. However, a UN Report of 
the Electoral Needs Assessment Mission to Madagascar of May 2012 has 
proposed that presidential and parliamentary elections should be conducted 
simultaneously in May/June 2013, to mark the end of the transition (UN, 2012). 
This gives reason to doubt whether an end to the transition and a return to 
constitutional order in Madagascar will be achieved within the year 2012.  
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Chapter 5 
Findings and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Summary of Findings  
 
This thesis has sought to explore if and how a normative approach toward 
unconstitutional changes of government has developed within the UN, AU and 
SADC, with Madagascar as the case study. In addition, this thesis has sought to 
assess whether such norms have emerged and diffused from the international 
level, as is commonly assumed, or if regional and/or sub-regional organisations 
have played an important part in this process. The resurgence of 
unconstitutional changes of government on the African continent has been 
regarded as a serious setback to the consolidation of democracy as well as a 
threat to the security, stability and development of African countries and its 
people. In arguing for the purpose and significance of the study it has been 
shown that regional and sub-regional organisations have gained an increasingly 
prominent role in promoting and maintaining peace and security on the African 
continent, in addition to the role of the UN. As a result, cases of unconstitutional 
changes of government have been found to involve international, regional as well 
as sub-regional organisations, leading to a ‘triangle for peace and security’ in 
which a particular case of unconstitutional change of government has involved a 
trilateral linkage between the UN, AU and RECs (Bah, 2010b: 284). 
To better understand the manner in which these organisations perceive of 
and respond to security challenges, the constructivist approach was presented in 
Chapter Two as the theoretical framework for this thesis, with a particular 
emphasis upon norm emergence, diffusion and internalisation. It was argued that 
norms set and reset standards of appropriate behaviour and serve as main 
vehicles for transformation and change in the international system. The first 
wave of scholarship on norm diffusion was presented, which placed an emphasis 
on the international level, arguing that norms emerge and diffuse from the 
international level and downwards. The second wave of scholarship was found to 
take a step further to underline the importance of regional, sub-regional and 
national actors in the dissemination and internalisation of international norms. 
However, both of these approaches were found to support the assumption that 
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international norms most commonly emerge from the international level and 
spread downwards, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. A main 
question in this thesis however has been whether this is the case for norms on 
unconstitutional changes of government.     
Chapter Three first presented a background of the UN, AU and SADC to 
provide an historical-political understanding of how these organisations have 
developed in their approach towards peace and security challenges. This builds 
upon the constructivist approach, placing emphasis upon how change comes 
about in the international system. Examples were given of how each of these 
organisations have changed in how they think about and approach peace and 
security, exemplified by the shift from regime to human security as well as the 
shift from the principle of non-intervention to the principle of non-indifference.  
The bulk of Chapter Three sought to explore in detail if and how 
normative approaches toward unconstitutional changes of government have 
developed within the UN, AU and SADC. It was found that the UN does not 
currently have any doctrine or normative framework in place which explicitly 
outlines its approach toward unconstitutional changes of government. It has 
responded to cases on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis, and research has shown 
that the UN has preferred a degree of flexibility in responding to such instances. 
However, an internal review by the UN in 2009 underlined the need on the part 
of the UN to formulate a coherent UN strategy and position on coups d’état and 
unconstitutional changes of government. These steps forward are explained to 
come largely as a result of the recent instances of unconstitutional changes of 
government in Africa and the acknowledgement by the UN that the AU has 
developed a comprehensive normative framework on this issue. The large 
strides taken by the AU therefore seems to be an important factor for the UN, and 
may perhaps influence the development of an explicit normative framework on 
unconstitutional changes of government within the UN.  
 The AU was found to have a robust normative framework, particularly 
outlined in the Constitutive Act and Lomé Declaration of 2000 as well as the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007. These 
documents point out a range of guiding principles and common values of the 
OAU/AU, including respect for human rights and democratic principles and the 
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condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. A 
clear definition of unconstitutional changes of government is provided in the 
Lomé Declaration and supplemented by the African Charter, focusing not only on 
how governments come into power but also on how ruling parties stay in power 
on a constitutionally legal and democratic basis. These policy documents also 
provide a range of standard responses which serve to operationalise the 
common principles and norms on unconstitutional changes of government 
within the AU.  
 SADC was found to resemble the UN in that it does not have an explicit 
framework on unconstitutional changes of government. In similarity to the UN, 
numerous policy documents were shown to reflect a common language on the 
promotion of democracy and good governance, transparency, respect for the rule 
of law and respect for human rights. Interviewees explained that, as part of the 
African peace and security architecture of the AU, SADC accepts and supports the 
policies and legal instruments of the AU and therefore bases its position on 
unconstitutional changes of government on the policies of the AU.  
In sum, Chapter Three found that although the AU has a clear normative 
framework on unconstitutional changes of government, both the UN and SADC 
have yet to develop explicit policy documents on this issue. Instead, both the UN 
and SADC have referred to the policies of the AU when addressing 
unconstitutional changes of government on the African continent.  
 On the basis of the argument that norms provide the premises for action 
and that we can recognize norm-breaking behaviour if it generates disapproval 
or stigma, Chapter Four sought to assess if and how the UN, AU and SADC have 
responded to the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar. The 
responses to Madagascar, or not, are considered to provide further evidence of 
whether or not a norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government has 
become salient within these organisations. 
Both the AU and SADC explicitly condemned the unconstitutional change 
of government in Madagascar and barred the country from its activities. Whilst 
SADC initially took a hard-line stance, insinuating the use of force and demanding 
the unconditional and immediate reinstatement of Ravalomanana, it quickly fell 
in line with the AU and UN in seeking a solution through diplomatic channels. 
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Following a series of mediations led both by the AU and SADC, these two 
organisations duly implemented sanctions as provided for in the AU Lomé 
Declaration. Whilst there were a few sources for contention, SADC was found to 
support the policies of the AU and refer specifically to these documents in 
explaining its response to Madagascar.  
Whilst the AU and SADC maintained a firm stance and continued sanctions 
against the country, the UN position cannot be described as having been firm and 
consistent during the time period under study. The UN did not explicitly 
condemn the unconstitutional change of government in the first place, although 
it took an active part in the ICG-M and JMT-M and also provided support through 
large parts of the mediation process. In addition, several actions by the UN 
served to undermine the mediation process exemplified by the invitation to 
Rajoelina as Head of State to address the UN General Assembly in September 
2009, the invitation to the 4th UN Conference on LDCs in May 2011 and the 
invitation to the 66th Ordinary Session of the General Assembly in September 
2011. Whilst the UN did recognize the crisis in Madagascar as an 
unconstitutional change of government and did provide support during large 
parts of the mediation processes, the UN was not consistent in its approach and 
took a much softer stance than the AU and SADC.  
 
5.2 What Implications for the Norm Condemning Unconstitutional Changes 
of Government?  
 
The constructivist approach argues for the importance of ideational factors 
which influence and shape the ideas, interests and identities of actors within the 
international system. In seeking to understand how international and regional 
actors such as the UN, AU and SADC think about and respond to peace and 
security challenges on the African continent, norms matter. Norms are defined as 
a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity, and may 
define or constitute identities as well as prescribe or regulate behaviour 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 5). Norms are therefore important factors which may 
provide insight into what causes political outcomes. It is within this theoretical 
framework that I have sought to answer the main research questions of this 
thesis.  
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 The life cycle of a norm, as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), 
has provided the theoretical foundation for assessing how norms emerge, spread 
and become internalised within the international system. The first wave of 
scholarship was found to place emphasis on the first and second stage, namely 
norm emergence and diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) acknowledge that 
domestic factors may be important particularly at the stage of norm emergence 
and that international and domestic norms are deeply intertwined. However, 
they place particular emphasis upon transnational agents and processes shaping 
norm diffusion at the level of the international system (Acharya, 2004: 240). The 
second wave of scholarship places emphasis upon local and domestic factors, but 
focuses particularly upon the second and third stage of the life cycle of a norm, 
namely norm diffusion and internalisation. Whilst domestic factors are of main 
concern, norms are still referred to as ‘foreign’ and ‘international’ norms thereby 
maintaining the top-down approach in understanding how norms have emerged 
and diffused in the international system.  
 The objectives of this thesis have been to assess the salience of a norm 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, AU and 
SADC. On the basis of these findings, the study sought to assess how this norm 
has emerged, spread and become internalised within these organisations. To 
identify the salience of a norm condemning unconstitutional changes of 
government, this study sought to identify if a normative framework was at all 
present within the UN, AU and SADC and how these organisations have 
responded to a case of norm-breaking behaviour. Findings show that the AU 
clearly has a robust normative framework on unconstitutional changes of 
government, whilst the UN and SADC have yet to develop clear policies on this 
topic area. However, SADC has explicitly condemned unconstitutional changes of 
government in formal communiqués, whilst the UN was found to have a weaker 
and less consistent stance. Furthermore, all three organisations did acknowledge 
the case of Madagascar as having been unconstitutional and responded to this 
case through mediation processes under the auspices of the AU and SADC. On the 
basis of these findings we may therefore conclude that the norm condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government is salient particularly within the AU, to a 
lesser degree in SADC, and quite questionably within the UN.  
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 In tracking the development of normative frameworks on 
unconstitutional changes of government within the UN, AU and SADC and their 
response to Madagascar, this study was also able to explore how these norms 
have emerged, diffused and become internalised. Findings show that the norm 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government has emerged particularly 
within the AU. Clear policy documents have developed from the late 1990s, 
providing both a norm-based principled stance on the subject as well as 
mechanisms to address norm-breaking behaviour. The ratification of the African 
Charter in February 2012 has further strengthened the clear stance of the AU on 
this issue area.  
Looking at stage two of the life cycle of a norm, namely norm diffusion, the 
works of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Legro (1997) and Acharya (2004) all 
place emphasis upon the international level and how ‘international’ and ‘foreign’ 
norms have spread and become internalised at the domestic level. It is 
particularly at this stage that the findings of this thesis do not support the 
assumptions of the above mentioned authors. Whilst the AU may be described as 
an international organisation, it is a regional organisation on the African 
continent addressing peace and security issues which are led by the overarching 
international organisation of the UN. Both in seeking to identify the normative 
frameworks on unconstitutional changes of government in the UN and SADC and 
in seeking to understand how and why they responded to Madagascar as they 
did, both the UN and SADC explicitly refer to the policies and mechanisms of the 
AU. Furthermore, respondents have openly acknowledged the large strides the 
AU has made on this particular issue area and explained that this has 
undoubtedly influenced and can perhaps even explain the approach toward and 
response to unconstitutional changes of government by the UN and SADC.  
These findings therefore challenge main assumptions on norm 
scholarship and particularly on the life cycle of a norm. In studying the 
emergence, diffusion and internalisation of a norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government, this study finds that it is actually the AU, at the regional 
level, which has been central. Furthermore, the understanding of and approach 
toward unconstitutional changes of government within the UN and SADC seem 
largely to be informed and influenced by the strong stance of the AU. The 
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emergence, diffusion and internalisation of a norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government therefore seems to be led by the AU (in the context of the 
African continent), emphasizing the prominent and important role regional 
organisations have in promoting and spreading norms within the international 
system.  
We may further infer that the internalisation process of the norm 
condemning unconstitutional changes of government has perhaps barely begun. 
As outlined by the internal review of the UN in 2009, decisions and policies may 
be taken in the near future but remain to be seen. The final outcome on the case 
of Madagascar may also serve to inform how SADC choses to approach 
unconstitutional changes of government in the southern African region in the 
future, and if it choses to develop clear policies on this issue area. It is clear 
however that both organisations acknowledge the norm condemning 
unconstitutional changes of government, although a consistent and principled 
approach and mechanisms for action cannot be said to be present at the time of 
writing.  
 
5.3 Final Remarks and Further Research  
 
This study has been limited to a focus upon the UN, AU and SADC. There are 
however numerous additional actors involved in addressing instances of 
unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, and worldwide. In seeking to 
broaden our understanding of how the norm condemning unconstitutional 
changes of government has emerged and spread within the international system, 
studies upon additional international, regional, sub-regional and national actors 
may be particularly useful.  
 The single case study on Madagascar also limits the opportunity to draw 
major generalisations. Additional studies on the responses by the UN, AU and 
SADC to a larger number of cases of unconstitutional changes of government may 
therefore serve to add greater insight into how these organisations respond and 
whether these responses are consistent. Other studies have shown mixed results 
in the responses to unconstitutional changes of government by the UN, AU and 
SADC. The trilateral linkage between these organisations in addressing a larger 
number of cases could therefore be of interest.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
 
 The manner in which the UN, AU and SADC coordinate their actions and 
ensure information sharing, both within the respective organisations and 
between them, is also an area for further study. The case of Madagascar clearly 
portrayed a series of instances which reflected a weak and disorganised 
response and several instances of misunderstanding and sources for contention. 
Cooperation for collective responses by the UN, AU and SADC is therefore an 
interesting area of study. A closer study of the Framework for the Ten Year 
Capacity Building Plan for the AU and its relevance in ensuring collective 
responses toward unconstitutional changes of government could be one source 
for further exploration.  
 This thesis has focused particularly upon the processes which have sought 
to return Madagascar to constitutional order. There are however numerous issue 
areas which must be acknowledged and addressed to ensure the return to 
constitutional order, to avoid such occurrences in the future and to ensure peace, 
stability and development in the country. A greater understanding of the root 
causes of the conflict and a focus upon these issues in transition processes could 
therefore be studied in greater detail. Studies show that power-sharing 
arrangements often do not address root causes of conflicts and may cause apathy 
amongst the general population in taking part in democratic processes in the 
future. These issues raise the question of whether recurrent cases of 
unconstitutional changes of government in a country serve to increase the 
likelihood of unconstitutional changes of government in the future, and thereby 
weaken democratisation processes.  
 In addition to studying responses to unconstitutional changes of 
government, another area of study should focus on what preventive measures 
are taken to avoid such instances in the first place. In addition, looking beyond 
the illegal accession to power, how have the UN, AU and SADC addressed the 
illegal retention of power? As the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance was only ratified in February 2012, in remains to be seen how 
sections four and five of Article 23 are applied to the illegal retention of power.  
 Lastly, a significant challenge in addressing unconstitutional changes of 
government is the issue of maintaining democracy by democratic means 
(Sturman, 2011). As was the case in Madagascar, the perpetrator of the 
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unconstitutional change of government has subsequently been involved in the 
mediation and transition process. The question must therefore be raised if the 
processes of transition comply with democratic principles and the will of the 
general population? It also raises a question of legitimacy, when constitutional 
order is sought through transition and electoral processes which includes the 
perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government. These are important 
questions which the UN, AU and SADC must address so that the solutions to 
unconstitutional changes of government in the future do not directly contradict 
the principles and norms of the organisations.  
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